A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings / On Moral, Historical, Political, and Literary Subjects

by Noah Webster

The opposition to the Congressional acts in favor of the officers, and to the order of the Cincinnati, did not rise to the same pitch in the other States as in Connecticut; yet it produced much disturbance in Massachusetts, and some others. Jealousy of power had been universally spread among the people of the United States. The destruction of the old forms of governments, and the licentiousness of war had, in a great measure, broken their habits of obedience; their passions had been inflamed by the cry of despotism; and like centinels, who have been suddenly surprised by the approach of an enemy, the rustling of a leaf was sufficient to giv them an alarm. This spirit of jealousy, which has not yet subsided, and which will probably continue visible during the present generation, operated with other causes to relax the energy of our federal operations.

During the war, vast sums of paper currency had been emitted by Congress, and large quantities of specie had been introduced, towards the close of the war, by the French army, and the Spanish trade. This plenty of money enabled the States to comply with the first requisitions of Congress; so that during two or three years, the federal treasury was, in some measure, supplied. But when the danger of war had ceased, and the vast importations of foreign goods had lessened the quantity of circulating specie, the States began to be very remiss in furnishing their proportion of monies. The annihilation of the credit of the paper bills had totally stopped their circulation, and the specie was leaving the country in cargoes, for remittances to Great Britain; still the luxurious habits of the people, contracted during the war, called for new supplies of goods, and private gratification seconded the narrow policy of State interest in defeating the operations of the general government.

Thus the revenues of Congress were annually diminishing; some of the States wholly neglecting to make provision for paying the interest of the national debt; others making but a partial provision, until the scanty supplies received from a few of the rich States, would hardly satisfy the demands of the civil list.

This weakness of the federal government, in conjunction with the flood of certificates or public securities, which Congress could neither fund nor pay, occasioned them to depreciate to a very inconsiderable value. The officers and soldiers of the late army were obliged to receive for wages these certificates, or promissary notes, which passed at a fifth, or eighth, or a tenth of their nominal value; being thus deprived at once of the greatest part of the reward due for their services. Some indeed profited by speculations in these evidences of the public debt; but such as were under a necessity of parting with them, were robbed of that support which they had a right to expect and demand from their countrymen.

Pensylvania indeed made provision for paying the interest of her debts, both State and federal; assuming her supposed proportion of the continental debt, and giving the creditors her own State notes in exchange for those of the United States. The resources of that State are immense, but she has not been able to make punctual payments, even in a depreciated paper currency.

Massachusetts, in her zeal to comply fully with the requisitions of Congress, and satisfy the demands of her own creditors, laid a heavy tax upon the people. This was the immediate cause of the rebellion in that State, in 1786. But a heavy debt lying on the State, added to burdens of the same nature, upon almost every incorporation within it; a decline, or rather an extinction of public credit; a relaxation and corruption of manners, and a free use of foreign luxuries; a decay of trade and manufactures, with a prevailing scarcity of money; and, above all, individuals involved in debt to each other: These were the real, though more remote causes of the insurrection. It was the tax which the people were required to pay, that caused them to feel evils which we have enumerated: This called forth all their other grievances; and the first act of violence committed, was the burning or destroying of a tax bill. This sedition threw the State into a convulsion which lasted about a year; courts of justice were violently obstructed; the collection of debts was suspended; and a body of armed troops, under the command of General Lincoln, was employed during the winter of 1786, to disperse the insurgents. Yet so numerous were the latter in the counties of Worcester, Hampshire and Berkshire, and so obstinately combined to oppose the execution of law by force, that the Governor and Council of the State thought proper not to intrust General Lincoln with military powers, except to act on the defensiv, and to repel force with force, in case the insurgents should attack him. The leaders of the rebels however were not men of talents; they were desperate, but without fortitude; and while they were supported with a superior force, they appeared to be impressed with that consciousness of guilt, which awes the most daring wretch, and makes him shrink from his purpose. This appears by the conduct of a large party of the rebels before the magazine at Springfield; where General Shepard with a small guard, was stationed to protect the continental stores. The insurgents appeared upon the plain, with a vast superiority of numbers, but a few shot from the artillery made the multitude retreat in disorder, with the loss of four men. This spirited conduct of General Shepard, with the industry, perseverance and prudent firmness of General Lincoln, dispersed the rebels, drove the leaders from the State, and restored tranquillity. An act of indemnity was passed in the Legislature for all the insurgents, except a few leaders, on condition they should become peaceable subjects, and take the oath of allegiance. The leaders afterwards petitioned for pardon, which, from motivs of policy, was granted by the Legislature.

But the loss of public credit, popular disturbances, and insurrections, were not the only evils which were generated by the peculiar circumstances of the times. The emissions of bills of credit and tender laws, were added to the black catalogue of political disorders.

The expedient of supplying the deficiencies of specie, by emissions of paper bills, was adopted very early in the colonies. The expedient was obvious and produced good effects. In a new country, where population is rapid, and the value of lands increasing, the farmer finds an advantage in paying legal interest for money; for if he can pay the interest by his profits, the increasing value of his lands will, in a few years, discharge the principal.

In no colony was this advantage more sensibly experienced than in Pensylvania. The emigrants to that province were numerous; the natural population rapid; and these circumstances combined, advanced the value of real property to an astonishing degree. As the first settlers there, as well as in other provinces, were poor, the purchase of a few foreign articles drained them of specie. Indeed for many years, the balance of trade must have necessarily been greatly against the colonies.

But bills of credit, emitted by the State and loaned to the industrious inhabitants, supplied the want of specie, and enabled the farmer to purchase stock. These bills were generally a legal tender in all colonial or private contracts, and the sums issued did not generally exceed the quantity requisit for a medium of trade; they retained their full nominal value in the purchase of commodities. But as they were not received by the British merchants, in payment for goods, there was a great demand for specie and bills, which occasioned the latter at various times to appreciate. Thus was introduced a difference between the English sterling money and the currencies of the colonies which remains to this day.[47]