[25] Cf. below, pp. lvi ff., 571 ff.
[26] Cf. below, pp. 36-7.
[27] Cf. below, p. 543 ff.
[28] Cf. below, pp. liii-iv.
[29] Cf. below, pp. 45, 238-43.
[30] Cf. below, pp. 33-6, 181, 183-6.
[31] Cf. below, pp. 33-42, 394-5, 398.
[32] With the sole exception of Malebranche, who on this point anticipated Kant.
[33] This is the position that Kant endeavours to expound in the very unsatisfactory form of a doctrine of “inner sense.” Cf. below, pp. l-ii, 291 ff.
[34] This was Kant’s chief reason for omitting the so-called “subjective deduction of the categories” from the second edition. The teaching of the subjective deduction is, however, preserved in almost unmodified form throughout the Critique as a whole, and its “transcendental psychology” forms, as I shall try to show, an essential part of Kant’s central teaching. In this matter I find myself in agreement with Vaihinger, and in complete disagreement with Riehl and the majority of the neo-Kantians. The neo-Kantian attempt to treat epistemology in independence of all psychological considerations is bound to lead to very different conclusions from those which Kant himself reached. Cf. below, pp. 237 ff., 263-70.