[45] Cf. Concerning the Advances made by Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff (Werke (Hartenstein), viii. 530-1): “I am conscious to myself of myself—this is a thought which contains a twofold I, the I as subject and the I as object. How it should be possible that I, the I that thinks, should be an object ... to myself, and so should be able to distinguish myself from myself, it is altogether beyond our powers to explain. It is, however, an undoubted fact ... and has as a consequence the complete distinguishing of us off from the whole animal kingdom, since we have no ground for ascribing to animals the power to say I to themselves.”
[46] Cf. above, p. xxxiv; below, pp. 250-3, 260-3, 285-6.
[47] Cf. A 651 = B 679: “The law of Reason, which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, as without it we should have no Reason at all, and without Reason no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this no sufficient criterion of empirical truth.” Cf. also below, pp. 390-1, 414-17, 429-31, 519-21, 558-61.
[48] Regarding a further complication, due to the fact that the Dialectic was written before the teaching of the Analytic was properly matured, cf. above, p. xxiv.
[49] Cf. below, pp. 331, 390-1, 414-17.
[50] Cf. below, pp. 22, 33, 56, 66 ff.
[51] Reflexionen (B. Erdmann’s edition) ii. 204.
[52] For an alternative and perhaps more adequate method of describing Kant’s general position, cf. below, p. 571 ff.
[53] Above, pp. xxxviii-ix, xlii, xliv.
[54] Cf. below, p. 577.