[145] Cf. above, p. xxv ff.; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.
[146] This statement is first made in the Introduction to the second edition. It is really out of keeping with the argument of the Introduction in either edition. Cf. below, pp. 39-40, 57, 85, 168, 222, 245 ff. (especially pp. 278, 288).
[147] This is the argument of the Introduction to the second edition. In the first edition Kant assumes without question the existence of the a priori. He enquires only whether it is also valid in its metaphysical employment beyond the field of possible experience.
[148] The argument of the first edition, though briefer, is substantially the same.
[149] Quoted below, pp. 219-20.
[150] Cf. below, pp. 114, 290, 590.
[151] A 6 = B 10. I here follow the wording of the second edition.
[152] Kant’s view of the a priori differs from that of Leibniz in two respects. For Kant a priori concepts are merely logical functions, i.e. empty; and secondly, are always synthetic. Cf. above, pp. xxxiii-vi, 186, 195-6, 257-8, 290-1, 404 ff.
[153] Cf. above, pp. xxv-vii; below, pp. 61 ff., 593 ff.
[154] B 24.