[175] Cf. above, pp. xxxiii ff., 1-2, 26 ff.
[176] i. pp. 317 and 450 ff.
[177] i. p. 412 ff.; cf. p. 388 ff.
[178] Cf. below, pp. 219-20.
[179] Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 394. Cf. above, p. 28.
[180] Cf. Vaihinger, i. pp. 415-17.
[181] Paulsen objects that if synthetic a priori judgments are valid without explanation, they do not need it. For two reasons the objection does not hold. (a) Without this explanation it would be impossible to repel the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics (cf. A 209 = B 254-5; A 283 = B 285). (b) This solution of the theoretical problem has also, as above stated, its own intrinsic interest and value. Without such explanation the validity of these judgments might be granted, but could not be understood. (Cf. Prolegomena, §§ 4-5 and § 12 at the end. Cf. Vaihinger, i. p. 394.)
[182] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 336. The argument of the Analytic, which is still more complicated, will be considered later.
[183] Cf. A 46-9 = B 64-6. The corresponding sections of the Prolegomena, Vaihinger contends, were developed from this first edition passage, and the transcendental exposition of space in the second edition from the argument of the Prolegomena.
[184] The synthetic method of argument is, as we shall see later, further extended in the Analytic by being connected with the problem of the validity of ordinary experience. But as the mathematical sciences are proved to have the same conditions as—neither more nor less than—the consciousness of time, this also allows of a corresponding extension of the analytic method. The mathematical sciences can be substituted for the de facto premiss by which these conditions are proved.