[365] A 248 (occurs in a lengthy section omitted in B).
[366] This distinction between intuition and appearance practically coincides with that above noted between intuition and its object.
[367] For statement of the precise meaning in which these terms are here employed, cf. above, pp. xlv-vii; below, pp. 270 ff., 312 ff.
[368] This would harmonise with the view developed in A 166 (in its formulation of the principle of the Anticipations), A 374 ff., B 274 ff., A 723 = B 751.
[369] Cf. A 50 = B 74: “We may name sensation the matter of sensuous knowledge.” Similarly in A 42 = B 59; Prolegomena, § 11; Fortschritte, (Hartenstein, viii. p. 527).
[370] Cf. below, p. 274 ff.
[371] Cf. below, pp. 366-7, 370-2, 377.
[372] ii. p. 59.
[373] A 42 = B 60.
[374] Cf. Reflexionen, ii. note to 469; also note to 357.