[405] Cf. below, p. 291 ff., on Kant’s reasons for developing his doctrine of inner sense.
[406] As no one passage can be regarded as quite decisively proving Kant’s belief in a pure manifold of intuition, the question can only be decided by a collation of all the relevant statements in the light of the general tendencies of Kant’s thinking.
[407] This at least would seem to be implied in the wording of his later positions; it is not explicitly avowed.
[408] Cf. A 76-7 = B 102.
[409] Cf. above, pp. xlii, 38-42; below, pp. 118-20, 128-34.
[410] The last statement may be more freely translated: “Only in this way can I get the intuition before me in visible form.” Cf. below, pp. 135-6, 347-8, 359.
[411] B 202-3.
[412] Cf. Reflexionen, ii. 393, 409, 465, 630, 649.
[413] This, indeed, is Kant’s reason for describing space as an Idea of reason. Cf. below, pp. 97-8.
[414] Geometry is for Kant the fundamental and chief mathematical science (cf. A 39 = B 56 and Dissertation, § 15 c). In this respect he is a disciple of Newton, not a follower of Leibniz. His neglect to take adequate account of arithmetic and algebra is due to this cause. Just as in speaking of the manifold of sense he almost invariably has sight alone in view, so in speaking of mathematical science he usually refers only to geometry and the kindred discipline of pure mechanics.