[545] Cf. above, pp. 116-17.
[546] Cf. W. x. p. 102. Mendelssohn had also protested; cf. op. cit. x. p. 110.
[547] W. x. pp. 128-9. Italics not in Kant. Kant is entirely justified in protesting against the view that in denying things in themselves to be in time he is asserting that they remain eternally the same with themselves. To make a dancer preserve one and the same posture is not to take him out of time, but to bring home to him the reality of time in an extremely unpleasant manner. Duration is one of the modes of time.
[548] This is Kant’s reply to Mendelssohn’s objection (December 1770, W. x. p. 110): “Succession is at least a necessary condition of the representations of finite spirits. Now the finite spirits are not only subjects but also objects of representations, both for God and for our fellow-men. The succession must therefore be regarded as something objective.”
[549] Cf. A 277 = B 333: “It is not given to us to observe even our own mind with any intuition but that of our inner sense.”
[550] Quoted by Vaihinger, ii. p. 406.
[551] In the fourth Paralogism, A 366, and in the Refutation of Idealism, B 274.
[552] Cf. A 42 = B 59.
[553] Above, pp. 113-14.
[554] Cf. Vaihinger, ii. p. 114.