[595] W. x. p. 405.
[596] Schein is so used by Kant himself (W. x. p. 105) in a letter to Lambert in 1770.
[597] A 38.
[598] Cf. above, A 39 = B 57. This is, however, merely asserted by implication; it is not proved. As already noted, Kant does not really show that space and time, viewed as absolute realities, are “inconsistent with the principles of experience.” Nor does Kant here supply sufficient grounds for his description of space and time as Undinge. Kant, it must be observed, does not regard the conception of the actual infinite as in itself self-contradictory. Cf. below, p. 486.
[599] B 275.
[600] Cf. below, p. 298 ff., on Kant’s Refutations of Idealism. This is also the meaning in which Kant employs the term in his pre-Critical writings. Cf. Dilucidatio (1755), prop. xii. usus; Träume eines Geistersehers (1766), ii. 2, W. ii. p. 364. These citations are given by Janitsch (Kant’s Urtheile über Berkeley, 1879, p. 20), who also points out that the term is already used in this sense by Bülffinger as early as 1725, Dilucidationes philos. This is also the meaning in which the term is employed in B xxxiv. Cf. A 28 = B 44.
[601] Prolegomena; Anhang. W. iv. pp. 374-5.
[602] In his Kleine Aufsätze (3. Refutation of Problematic Idealism, Hartenstein, v. p. 502) Kant would seem very inconsistently to accuse Berkeley of maintaining a solipsistic position. “Berkeley denies the existence of all things save that of the being who asserts them.” This is probably, however, merely a careless formulation of the statement that thinking beings alone exist. Cf. Prolegomena, § 13, Anm. ii.
[603] Prolegomena, W. iv. p. 375; Eng. trans. p. 148.
[604] Borowski (Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kant, in Hoffman’s ed. 1902, p. 248 ff.) gives a list of English writers with whom Kant was acquainted. They were, according to Janitsch (loc. cit. p. 35), accessible in translation. Cf. above, pp. xxviii n. 3, 63 n. 1.