[665] Cf. below, p. 425 ff.
[666] Kant employs Gegenstand and Object as synonymous terms.
[667] Cf. below, p. 426.
[668] A 64 = B 89.
[669] A 65 = B 90.
[670] The opening statement, A 67 = B 92, that hitherto understanding has been defined only negatively, is not correct, and would seem to prove that this section was written prior to the introduction to the Analytic, cf. above, p. 167.
[671] See above, pp. 170-1.
[672] A 79 = B 105. ‘Element’ translates the misleading term ‘Inhalt.’
[673] Kant’s definition of transcendental logic as differing from general logic in that it does not abstract from a priori content must not be taken as implying that the categories of understanding are contents, though of a priori nature. As we shall find, though that is Kant’s view of the forms of sense, it is by no means his view of the categories. They are, he repeatedly insists, merely functions, and are quite indeterminate in meaning save in so far as a content is yielded to them by sense. In A 76-7 = B 102, in distinguishing between the two logics, Kant is careful to make clear that the a priori content of transcendental logic consists exclusively of the a priori manifolds of sense.
[674] § 20, Eng. trans. p. 58.