[765] Cf. Reflexionen, ii. 952 (belonging, as Erdmann notes, to the earliest Critical period): “Appearances are representations whereby we are affected. The representation of our free self-activity (Selbsttätigkeit) does not involve affection, and accordingly is not appearance, but apperception.” Cf. below, p. 296.
[766] § 8. Cf. above, pp. l-ii; below, pp. 243, 260-3, 272-3, 327-8, 473-7, 515.
[767] A 107. It is significant that Kant in A 107 uses, in reference to apperception, the very unusual phrase, “unwandelbares Bewusstsein.”
[768] A 108.
[769] A 107.
[770] Reicke, Lose Blätter, p. 19. The bearing and date of this passage is discussed below, p. 233.
[771] Op. cit. p. 20.
[772] Op. cit. p. 22 (written on a letter dated May 20, 1775).
[773] This last statement cannot possibly be taken literally. In view of the manner in which the transcendental object is spoken of elsewhere in this section, and also in the Dialectic, we must regard it as standing for an independent existence, and the relation of representations to it as being, therefore, something else than simply the unity of consciousness.
[774] It may be observed that when Kant in A 107, quoted above, refers to “a priori concepts,” he adds in explanation, and within brackets, “space and time.”