Should readers who are already well acquainted with the Critique desire to use my Commentary for its systematic discussions of Kant’s teaching, rather than as an accompaniment to their study of the text, I may refer them to those sections which receive italicised headings in the table of contents.

NORMAN KEMP SMITH.

London, January 1918.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
PAGE
I. Textual—
Kant’s Method of composing the Critique of Pure Reason[xix]
II. Historical—
Kant’s Relation to Hume and to Leibniz[xxv]
III. General—
1. The Nature of the a priori[xxxiii]
2. Kant’s Contribution to the Science of Logic[xxxvi]
3. The Nature of Consciousness[xxxix]
4. Phenomenalism, Kant’s Substitute for Subjectivism[xlv]
5. The Distinction between Human and Animal Intelligence[xlvii]
6. The Nature and Conditions of Self-Consciousness[l]
7. Kant’s threefold Distinction between Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason[lii]
8. The place of the Critique of Pure Reason in Kant’s Philosophical System[lv]
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON[1]
Title[1]
Motto[4]
Dedication to Freiherr von Zedlitz[6]
Preface To the First Edition[8]
Comment on Preface[10]
Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism[13]
Preface To the Second Edition[17]
The Copernican Hypothesis[22]
Introduction[26]
Comment upon the Argument of Kant’s Introduction[33]
How are Synthetic a priori Judgments possible?[43]
The Analytic and Synthetic Methods[44]
Purpose and Scope of the Critique[56]
Kant’s relation to Hume[61]
Meaning of the term Transcendental[73]
The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
Part I. The Transcendental Aesthetic[79-166]
Definition of Terms[79]
Kant’s conflicting Views of Space[88]
Section I. Space[99]
Kant’s Attitude to the Problems of Modern Geometry[117]
Section II. Time[123]
Kant’s Views regarding the Nature of Arithmetical Science[128]
Kant’s conflicting Views of Time[134]
General Observations on the Transcendental Aesthetic[143]
The Distinction between Appearance and Illusion[148]
Kant’s Relation to Berkeley[155]
The Paradox of Incongruous Counterparts[161]
Part II. The Transcendental Logic[167]
Introduction[167]
I. Logic in General[167]
II. Transcendental Logic[170]
III. The Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic[172]
Division I. The Transcendental Analytic[174]
Book I. The Analytic of Concepts[175]
Chapter I. The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding[175]
Section I. The Logical Use of the Understanding[176]
Comment on Kant’s Argument[176]
Stages in the Development of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction[186]
Section II. The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgment[192]
Section III. The Categories on Pure Concepts of the Understanding[194]
Distinction between Logical Forms and Categories[195]
Chapter II. Deduction of the Pure Concepts Of The Understanding[202]
Analysis of the Text: the Four Stages in the Development of Kant’s Views[202-234]
I. Enumeration of the Four Stages[203]
II. Detailed Analysis of the Four Stages[204]
Kant’s Doctrine of the Transcendental Object[204]
III. Evidence yielded by the “Reflexionen” and “LoseBlätter” in Support of the Analysis of theText[231]
IV. Connected Statement and Discussion of Kant’sSubjective and Objective Deductions in theFirst Edition[234]
Distinction between the Subjective and the ObjectiveDeductions[235]
The Subjective Deduction in its initial empiricalStages[245]
Objective Deduction as given in the First Edition[248]
The later Stages of the Subjective Deduction[263]
The Distinction between Phenomenalism and Subjectivism[270]
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in theSecond Edition[284]
The Doctrine of Inner Sense[291]
Kant’s Refutations of Idealism[298]
Inner Sense and Apperception[321]
Book II. The Analytic of Principles[332]
Chapter I. The Schematism of Pure Concepts Ofthe Understanding[334]
Chapter II. System of All Principles of Pure Understanding[342]
1. The Axioms of Intuition[347]
2. The Anticipations of Perception[349]
3. The Analogies of Experience[355]
A. First Analogy[358]
B. Second Analogy[363]
Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument[365]
Kant’s Subjectivist and Phenomenalist Viewsof the Causal Relation[373]
Reply to Further Criticisms of Kant’s Argument[377]
C. Third Analogy[381]
Schopenhauer’s Criticism of Kant’s Argument[387]
4. The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General[391]
Chapter III. On the Ground of the Distinctionof all Objects whatever intoPhenomena and Noumena[404]
Relevant Passages in the Section on Amphiboly[410]
Alterations in the Second Edition[412]
Comment on Kant’s Argument[414]
Appendix. The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection[418]
Division II. The Transcendental Dialectic[424]
Introductory Comment upon the composite Origin andconflicting Tendencies of the Dialectic[425]
The History and Development of Kant’s Views inregard to the Problems of the Dialectic[431]
Introduction[441]
I. Transcendental Illusion[441]
II. Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusion[442]
Book I. The Concepts of Pure Reason[446]
Section I. Ideas in General[447]
Section II. The Transcendental Ideas[450]
Section III. System of the Transcendental Ideas[453]
Book II. The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason[455]
Chapter I. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason[455]
First Paralogism: of Substantiality[457]
Second Paralogism: of Simplicity[458]
Third Paralogism: of Personality[461]
Fourth Paralogism: of Ideality[462]
Second Edition Statement of the Paralogisms[466]
Is the Notion of the Self a necessary Idea of Reason?[473]
Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason[478]
Section I. System of the Cosmological Ideas[478]
Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason[480]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[481]
First Antinomy[483]
Second Antinomy[488]
Third Antinomy[492]
Fourth Antinomy[495]
Section III. The Interest of Reason in this Self-Conflict[498]
Section IV. Of the Transcendental Problems of PureReason in so far as they absolutely mustbe capable of Solution[499]
Section V. Sceptical Representation of the CosmologicalQuestions[501]
Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to theSolution of the Cosmological Dialectic[503]
Section VII. Critical Decision of the CosmologicalConflict of Reason with itself[504]
Section VIII. The Regulative Principle of Pure Reasonin regard to the Cosmological Ideas[506]
Section IX. The Empirical Employment of the RegulativePrinciples of Reason in regardto all Cosmological Ideas[508]
Solution of the First and Second Antinomies[508]
Remarks on the Distinction between theMathematical-Transcendental and theDynamical-Transcendental Ideas[510]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[510]
Solution of the Third Antinomy[512]
Possibility of harmonising Causality throughFreedom with the Universal Law ofNatural Necessity[513]
Explanation of the Relation of Freedom toNecessity of Nature[514]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[517]
Solution of the Fourth Antinomy[518]
Concluding Note on the whole Antinomyof Pure Reason[519]
Concluding Comment on Kant’s Doctrineof the Antinomies[519]
Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason[522]
Section I. and II. The Transcendental Ideal[522]
Comment on Kant’s Method ofArgument[524]
Section III. The Speculative Arguments in Proof of theExistence of a Supreme Being[525]
Section IV. The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof[527]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[528]
Section V. The Impossibility of a Cosmological Proofof the Existence of God[531]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[533]
Discovery and Explanation of the TranscendentalIllusion in all TranscendentalProof of the Existence of a necessaryBeing[534]
Comment on Kant’s Method of Argument[535]
Section VI. The Impossibility of the Physico-TheologicalProof[538]
Section VII. Criticism of all Theology based on speculativePrinciples of Reason[541]
Concluding Comment[541]
Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic[543]
The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason[543]
Hypotheses not permissible in Philosophy[543]
On the Final Purpose of the Natural Dialectic of HumanReason[552]
Concluding Comment on the Dialectic[558]
Appendix A.
The Transcendental Doctrine of Methods[563]
Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason[563]
Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in its DogmaticEmployment[563]
Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in itsPolemical Employment[567]
Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regardto Hypotheses[568]
Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in regardto its Proofs[568]
Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason[569]
Section I. The Ultimate End of the Pure Use of ourReason[569]
Section II. The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a DeterminingGround of the Ultimate End ofPure Reason[570]
Section III. Opining, Knowing, and Believing[576]
Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason[579]
Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason[582]
Appendix B.
A more detailed Statement of Kant’s Relations to his PhilosophicalPredecessors[583]
[Index]:[A],[B],[C],[D],[E],[F],[G],[H],[I],[J],[K],[L],[M],[N],[O],[P],[Q],[R],[S],[T],[U],[V],[W],[Z][607]

NOTE

In all references to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft I have given the original pagings of both the first and second editions. References to Kant’s other works are, whenever possible, to the volumes thus far issued in the new Berlin edition. As the Reflexionen Kants zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft had not been published in this edition at the time when the Commentary was completed, the numbering given is that of B. Erdmann’s edition of 1884.

ABBREVIATIONS

Berlin edition of Kant’s worksW
Pagings in the first edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft A
Pagings in the second editionB
Adickes’ edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1889)K