Even with (unter) our experiences there is mingled knowledge which must be of a priori origin.[197]—Kant is here distinguishing the immanent a priori, such as that involved in any causal judgment, from the transcendent a priori dwelt upon in the next paragraph. The latter is expressed through metaphysical judgments, such as ‘God exists,’ ‘the soul is immortal.’
Original concepts and judgments derived from them.[198]—Cf. B 5-6.
Pure.—In the title of the section the term pure[199] (rein) is, as the subsequent argument shows, taken as exactly equivalent to a priori. As Vaihinger notes, the adjective apriorisch had not yet been invented. The opposite of pure is here empirical (empirisch).[200]
All our knowledge begins with experience.[201]—This is a stronger statement than any in the corresponding paragraphs of the first edition. Had Kant proceeded to develop its consequences, he would have had to recast the entire Introduction, setting the problem of empirical knowledge alongside that of the a priori.[202] As it is, he is forced[203] to subdivide the absolutely a priori into the pure and the mixed.[204]
By objects which affect (rühren) our senses. The raw material of sensuous impressions.[205]—These incidental statements call for discussion. Cf. below, pp. 80-8, 120-1, 274 ff.
A knowledge of objects which we call experience.[206]—Kant does not keep to this definition. The term experience is still used in its other and narrower sense, as in the very next paragraph, when Kant states that knowledge does not, perhaps, arise solely from experience (= sense impressions).
In respect of time.[207]—This statement, taken as an account of Kant’s teaching in the Critique, is subject to two reservations. In the Aesthetic[208] Kant sometimes claims a temporal antecedence for the a priori. And secondly, the a priori is not for Kant merely logical. It also possesses a dynamical priority.[209]
Even experience itself is a compound.[210]—The “even” seems to refer to the distinction drawn in A 2 between the immanent and the transcendent a priori.[211]
It is therefore a question whether there exists such knowledge independent of experience.[212]—This question was not raised in the first edition.[213] The alternative methods, analytic and synthetic, are discussed above, p. 44 ff.