[1075] B 278.
[1076] B 420 and B 422 n.
[1077] B 422 n.
[1078] Cf. above, pp. 204 ff., 404 ff.
[1079] Cf. above, p. 204 ff.
[1080] B 406.
[1081] B 422 n. Though both concepts are denoted by the same term, they may not—such is the implication—be for that reason identified.
[1082] B 429. Kant does not, however, even in the second edition, hold consistently to this position. In the sentence immediately preceding that just quoted he equates the transcendental self with the notion of “object in general.” “I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself, but think myself only as I do any object in general from whose mode of intuition I abstract.”
[1083] The broader bearing of this view may be noted. If consistently developed, it must involve the assertion that noumenal reality is apprehended in terms of the Ideas of reason, for these are the only other concepts at the disposal of the mind. Cf. above, pp. liii-v, 217-18; below, pp. 331, 390-1, 414-17, 426 ff., 558-61.
[1084] A 402.