[1715] The statement in A 801 = B 829 that morals is a subject foreign to transcendental philosophy is in line with that of A 14-15 = B 28, and conflicts with the position later adopted in the Critique of Practical Reason. Cf. above, p. 77.
[1716] A 803 = B 831-2.
[1717] Cf. below, pp. 571-5.
[1718] A 804 = B 832.
[1719] Cf. above, p. lvi.
[1720] These statements are subject to modification, if the distinction (not clearly recognised by Kant, but really essential to his position) between immanent and transcendent metaphysics is insisted upon. Cf. above, pp. liv-v, 22, 56, 66-70.
[1721] Cf. above, p. 541.
[1722] W. v. pp. 47-8; Abbott’s trans. (3rd edition) p. 136.
[1723] Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, W. v. pp. 31-7; Abbott’s trans. p. 120.
[1724] Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, W. v. p. 43; Abbott’s trans. p. 132: “The moral law, although it gives no view, yet gives us a fact absolutely inexplicable from any data of the sensible world, or from the whole compass of our theoretical use of reason, a fact which points to a pure world of the understanding, nay, even defines it positively, and enables us to know something of it, namely, a law.”