[1785] How far Hume’s criticism of empiricism really influenced Kant in his appreciation of this deeper problem, it seems impossible to decide. Very probably Kant proceeded to it by independent development of his own standpoint, after the initial impulse received on the more strictly logical issue.
[1786] The assertion, by Kuno Fischer and Paulsen, of an empirical period in Kant’s development, has been challenged by Adickes, B. Erdmann, Riehl, and Vaihinger.
[1787] Cf. B. Erdmann’s Kriticismus, p. 147; Critique of Judgment, W. v. p. 391 (Bernard’s trans, p. 301).
[1788] Above, pp. xxx-iii.
[1789] Philosophischer Kriticismus, 2nd ed. p. 209.
[1790] Cf. above, pp. lv-vi, lxi, 543 ff.
| Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber: |
|---|
| The transcenedntal doctrine=> The transcendental doctrine {pg 77} |
| non-commital=> non-committal {pg 122} |
| widersinnisches=> Widersinnisches {pg 444} |
| Erkenntniss=> Erkenntnis {pg 449} |
| themelves=> themselves {pg 505} |
| which contain the the material=> which contain the material {pg 523} |
| it as valid=> it is valid {pg 575} |