All orders, whether for a retreat, an attack, a defense, the establishment of an outpost and so on, should take this general form.
A MODEL ORDER FOR AN ADVANCE
Field Orders "Hq. 1st Brigade, 1st Division,
No. 6 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
Three inch Leavenworth 20 Aug. '08, 8 P. M.
Map (1) Two regiments of hostile infantry
Troops are reported to have occupied Valley(a) Advance Guard: Falls late this afternoon, en route for
Major A. Easton. Small hostile cavalry patrols
1st Bn & 8 mtd. orderlies, were seen two miles east of Valley 1st Inf. Falls at 6 P. M. to-day.
1st. Plat. Tr. A. The remainder of our division is expected
7th Cavalry to reach Fort Leavenworth(b) Main Body----in order to-morrow.
of March: (2) This brigade (less the 3d Inf.
Colonel B. which has been directed to hold the
1st. Inf. (less 1st Bn.) Missouri river crossing at Fort Leavenworth)
2d Infantry will march to-morrow to
Detachment 3d F. Easton to hold the crossings of the
Hosp. Big Stranger creek.
(a) The advance guard will clear D at 5-15 A. M., marching
via the E--G--Atchison Pike--1--74--78--80--Q--R--Easton road.
Patrols will be sent via Lowemont to reconnoiter the crossings of
the Big Stranger near Millwood and via Mount Olivet to reconnoiter
those near 114.
(b) The main body will follow at a distance of about 700 yards.
(4) The baggage train (less that of the 3d Inf.), escorted by
one squad, 2d Inf., will start from D at 6-15 A. M. and follow to
P where it will await further orders.
(5) Reports will reach the brigade commander at the head of
the main body.
By command of Brig.-Gen. X:
Y,
Adjt. Gen."
Copies by Adjutant to Col. B. 1st Inf.
Col. C. 2d Inf.
Col. D. 3d Inf.
Maj. A. 1st Inf.
Capt. E. Tr. A 7th Cav.
Capt. F. Hospital Corps.
GENERAL IDEAS AND RULES FOR SOLVING MILITARY PROBLEMS
The cave man knocked over his foe with a rude club. The operation is greatly refined to-day. The technique of war changes with the ages, but human nature remains the same. Whether with grenade or gas, from submarine or aëroplane, a man after all possible woe and suffering is no more than killed. Human nature will submit to losses in battle up to a certain point, after that the frailties are asserted. The instinct of self-preservation dominates. Organization and discipline and reason are dissipated. A condition ensues similar to that which we have in theaters during fires.
Napoleon's success as a military leader was due to his knowledge of men and how to handle them, common sense, and in a lesser degree to what he learned from books. Upon such a basis the young managers of industrial concerns would be most valuable material from which to select and train successful military leaders. They know men, and it is necessary to possess a world of common sense to acquire any such knowledge. Many of those elements that make success in a military man are exactly the same as those that make a man successful anywhere. A president of a university, a lawyer or banker or merchant or engineer, has exactly the same kind of daily problems to solve, and requires much the same talents as those possessed by a military leader.
Since success in battle is the thing at which we are driving in all military training, it is common sense to prepare a machine that will do the business. Every officer and noncommissioned officer has got to know how to play the game. A good private makes a good corporal, a good corporal makes a good sergeant, a good sergeant makes a good lieutenant--a good colonel makes a good brigadier general--all exactly as in civil life.
Prussia has had her greatest military success when she devoted her energies to manœuvers and to the solution of tactical problems. Her defeats and humiliations have come when she has neglected this work. And there's nothing mysterious about the way Prussia or Napoleon or anybody else has solved their military problems. No occult forces are involved, any more than there is in building a canal or hunting tigers. The real general is, in a sense, a postgraduate hunter, or an advanced, all-American quarterback.
One phase of the military work is significant and should cause reflection. The punishment for errors in war is very severe. A leader who makes mistakes may not only pay for them with his own blood but others too may suffer with him. In war we must obey our leaders whether they are right or wrong. How great, do you suppose, are those hordes that have been sacrificed on history's battlefields to the goddess of ignorance?
Napoleon says in one of his maxims, "Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turrenne, Eugene, and Frederick; take them for your model; that is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war." To read more intelligently such history we should know something about solving problems in minor tactics. We must know how to solve such problems if we are to master our duties as officers.