LETTER LVIII.
Mayenne has arrived at Meaux with his army. He is, however, too weak to raise the siege of Paris, or to engage the King with a fair prospect of success. When offered battle he declined it, and withdrew to a safe position. The King thought this an additional reason for pressing the siege. Though he had effected a lodgment in the suburbs, yet the parts of them which were nearest the city were more in the citizens’ power than his own. He therefore resolved to push forward his entrenchments to the walls of the city. This operation was executed in a single night, the breastwork of the besiegers being carried up to the very gates. Thenceforth no one was able to enter or leave Paris without his permission. Meanwhile the famine was growing so sore, that it seemed impossible for them to hold out much longer, and more than 12,000 perished of hunger. The inhabitants, [260]however, bore their sufferings patiently, and preferred to hold out to the bitter end rather than abandon the cause for which they were fighting. They were sustained in this resolve by the promises of the Spanish Ambassador and the Papal Legate, who declared that the Duke of Parma himself was on the point of coming with a mighty army to their relief, an assertion which was soon afterwards verified. Parma arrived at last, after negotiations for peace had actually been opened. On the 6th of this month the Cardinal de Gondi and the Archbishop of Lyons, the Primate of Gaul,[266] went under a safe-conduct to the King. They failed to come to terms, but the negotiations were adjourned, in the hope that a further interchange of views might lead to peace. Finally, it was agreed that three commissioners on each side should meet at the fortress of Nanteuil[267] and the mansion of Schom[261]berg, nine French miles from Paris.[268] The prospects of peace thus appeared to be improving, when letters of Mayenne to his mother and wife were intercepted, in which he exhorted them to hold out a little longer, and told them that he was actually on the march to their relief; there was no fear, he added, that he would demean himself by acknowledging a heretic as his King, or by coming to terms with him. The King showed these letters to the Cardinal and Archbishop, and was on the point of breaking off negotiations, but at their entreaty he finally consented to await the day which had been fixed for the termination of the armistice, namely, the 26th of this month. He did not sacrifice much by this concession, as he had already decided to wait for a picked body of horse and foot, under Nevers and the Vicomte de Turenne, whom he expected in a few days. He only withdrew his cannon from the gates of Paris, and deposited them in St. Denis with his other heavy baggage, that he might have his hands free, if he were obliged to fight or should be summoned elsewhere, it being his usual practice to leave his baggage behind, when he undertakes any operation. Apart from this he made no change, and did not move a single soldier from his position under the ramparts of Paris.
In case of an engagement taking place, the news will in all probability reach your Majesty before my account of it arrives. Therefore, in order that your Majesty may be in a better position to estimate the value of such reports, I feel it my duty to submit for your consideration a sketch of both generals, the King and Mayenne, and their several forces. The contest will be one between two famous leaders, in the prime of life and at the height of their renown, one of whom, Mayenne, will give up the command to Parma, and will fight as his subordinate. The King is a thorough soldier, and a general of the greatest experience. When all his forces are concentrated, he will have, it is thought, some 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. The latter for the most part is composed of gentlemen, well armed and splendidly mounted. Of French infantry people think he will have 13,000, and of Swiss, with whom are a few Germans, 7,000. The élite of his foot consists of a body of four or five thousand Gascon veterans. All his troops, horse and foot alike, are devoted to their King, by whom they are accustomed to be led, and whose presence inspires them with confidence. Moreover, the King has with him veteran generals of great experience, whose advice and assistance are invaluable; namely, Biron, d’Aumont, La Noue, and many others. Round him too have gathered the Princes of the Bourbon blood, with the leading gentlemen from every part of France.
With regard to Parma and Mayenne, in point of generalship there is not much to choose between them, but it must be admitted that the latter is a most unlucky commander, while the former is a favourite of fortune, as is proved by his long list of successes in the Netherlands, and in this respect he may fairly be considered a match for the King. Their united infantry, as report goes, amounts to 17,000, while their cavalry is a little under 5,000 strong. Among their foot the Spaniards and Walloons are considered the best, and these, with the addition of some Italian companies, are not much over 4,000 strong. Next to these come the Germans; the French and Lorrainers are the worst.
The King and Parma are now wholly engaged in concocting devices against each other, the object being to inflict the maximum of damage with the minimum of loss to their own troops. To enable his men to resist the charge of the French cavalry, Parma encloses his infantry with a fence formed of ropes of the strongest and thickest description, which are supported by stout stakes at regular intervals. Immediately behind the ropes he posts his musketeers, who can thus fire on the French horse in perfect security. All the musketeers have a store of double bullets fastened together with copper wire, which will be very effective against horses. The cannon also are loaded with chain-shot, and masked batteries are planted in good positions, with troops drawn up in front so as to conceal them from the enemy; at the critical moment they will open fire, and pour a withering volley among the horses of their assailants.
Meanwhile the King is not idle. Every day he takes counsel with his craftiest and wisest captains, to see if they cannot devise a new mode of attack. Some weapon is to be invented or some wonderful manœuvre to be executed, which is to discomfit the enemy.
On each side, therefore, is a distinguished general and a powerful army. The King’s forces are supposed to be somewhat larger than Parma’s, and he has also a decided superiority in the composition of his troops, for, with a few exceptions, they are all men of the same nation and his own subjects, whereas Parma’s forces have been recruited from various nations, and are to a large extent made up of raw levies, on whom not much reliance can be placed. Again, the King has the great advantage of fighting on his own ground, that is to say, on ground which he has previously chosen and fortified, while Parma, by the circumstances of his position, is compelled to attack at a disadvantage.
Such are the premises; whether they are sufficient for forming an opinion as to what the result of a battle would be, is more than I can say. They are valuable only in the same sense as the warnings of a sunset are valuable in enabling us to guess what weather we shall have to-morrow. Besides, it is mere guessing, and no more; victory does not depend on scythed chariots, or horses, or on the number of soldiers, or the abundance of munitions, but solely on the will of God.
If I have lingered longer over this subject than has been agreeable, I trust I may be pardoned. That God may long preserve your Majesty is the prayer of your most humble servant.
Mantes, August 27, 1590.[269]