“John Clark, Esq. a Fellow of the Society of Scottish Antiquaries, introduced a new kind of naval tactics, since proved to be eminently successful. Before his tactics were introduced British ships were almost always victorious in battles between single ships, while in conflicts of whole fleets they seldom obtained an advantage. Their intrepidity and desire to engage, led them to attack from windward, which enabled their enemies, formed ready for them to leeward, to disable them, as they came into action, by injuring their masts and rigging, from following them when they chose to retire. Thus, fleet after fleet escaped, because British tars could not come into close action. Mr. Clark’s system found a remedy for this evil—by breaking the line. His principle is, to exert the chief force against the weakest or most vulnerable part of the enemy’s line. Admiral Rodney first broke through the French fleet on this principle, when its rear was driven to leeward in confusion and torn to pieces by a raking fire. Do you not understand, boys, that if an admiral, by cutting off one half of an enemy’s fleet, can bring the whole of his ships to bear on that part, he may, perhaps, obtain a victory before the other half of the enemy’s fleet can join the battle.”
“O yes, that is very clear. No wonder that admirals should wish to break the enemy’s line.”
“Lords Howe and Vincent, Duncan, and Nelson, have all followed out this principle with great success. Tactics are quite as necessary in the army as in the navy. Frederick the Great once gave much encouragement to a stranger who undertook to introduce some new and important tactics into his army. But General De Zeithen, seeing through the hollowness of the stranger’s pretensions, laid an ambuscade for him in a sham fight, took him prisoner, and brought him in bound, on horseback; which circumstance opened the eyes of Frederick to the empty pretensions of his new favourite.”
“Well done, General De Zeithen! His tactics were better than those of the would-be general.”
“When Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehemet Ali, was at Damascus, in Syria, with an army of forty thousand men, an old dervise arrived there, and hastened to give his staff to Ibrahim. In this staff the old dervise had safely carried a scrap of paper from Mehemet Ali, containing these words—‘Acre has been taken—return to Egypt.’ A council was called, and the European advisers of Ibrahim strongly urged him to retire, in one body, by the shortest road coastward, with baggage and provisions, as he would then be able to set every attack at defiance. Ibrahim unaccountably neglected this proposal, and following out his own mistaken plan, broke up his army into six divisions, giving fourteen days’ provisions to each, and sent them on to be harassed and distressed by the Turks and mountaineers, who hung upon them during the whole of their march. Ibrahim paid dear for his error in dividing his troops. It took him thirty-nine days to reach Gaza, during which time he twice marched round the Dead Sea, having mistaken his road, pursued by his enemies, who allowed him no respite, and compelled his troops to prolong their existence by eating herbs. It is said, that even in the retreat of Buonaparte from Moscow greater hardships were not endured than in that of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria.”
“How foolish, to divide his army.”
“It was foolish, and no doubt he thought so, long before he arrived at Gaza. The more you hear or read of tactics, the clearer you will see that the better they are understood the more likely is an army to be successful. It is generally agreed that there are some principles which should always be strictly attended to in the formation of all military bodies.
“First, Each regiment, or integral part of an army, must be under the uniform command of one man, interested in its good appearance, efficiency, and success, who must be responsible for his charge, and removeable when not found equal to his duty.
“Secondly, Its size should not be too great to admit of his personal inspection and superintendence, under all the circumstances of its ordinary situation, so that he may be thoroughly acquainted with every officer, and, generally, with the men.
“Thirdly, Promotion should be confined, as much as the interests of the service will permit, within each regiment, so that those who share equally in the perils of any duty should also share equally in the advantages resulting therefrom.