“It may seem almost miraculous that the allied fleet sustained so little injury, but this was principally owing to a mistake made by the garrison. Captain Boxer, and, I think, Captain Codrington, in surveying the anchorage, discovered a shoal, of some extent, opposite the wall, at the distance of about two thousand yards, and as this was likely to injure the shipping, a few buoys were placed to mark the place. The garrison mistook the buoys for moorings, and concluded that they marked out the intended stations of the ships. Their guns were accordingly elevated for that distance, and the embrasures filled up with sand-bags, to fix the elevation. This was a fatal error; for the fleet came inside the buoys; and taking up a position under the batteries, opened such a destructive fire as left the garrison no opportunity to alter their guns, or even to see their error, through the cloud of smoke, which, wafted by a light breeze, thickened, and hung like a dark canopy over the devoted fortress. The shot of the garrison, for the most part, passed over the hulls of the ships, only injuring the sails and rigging, so that the whole amount of killed and wounded, in a fleet of twenty-one ships, drawn up within a few hundred yards of a formidable battery, did not exceed three score men. Some mischief was done on board the fleet by the shells thrown by the garrison mortars, but, during a fire of four hours, there was scarcely one shot in twenty from the heavy guns that did not go over the hulls of the ships.”
“If it had not been for the mistake of the garrison, one half of the British ships might have been destroyed?”
“They might. And we see, by this accident, how by skill and tactics the commander of a fleet might, in many cases, preserve his ships and men, and gain a great advantage over his enemy. So long as British men, in the army and navy, keep up their present character for courage and discipline, and are led on by commanders in whom they have confidence, they will always rank as the bravest of the brave. I was to tell you of the siege of Antwerp. The general operations of a siege shall be described, and then we will come to Antwerp itself. You may remember what I said about fortification, and the little that I told you of a siege. Well, now I will be more particular in my description.”
“Now for it! How do they begin to fight?”
“The attack commences, not with the firing of cannon, the throwing of shells, or by marching soldiers up to the walls or ditch of the fortified place, but with pickaxes and spades.”
“Pickaxes and spades! What, do soldiers fight with such weapons as these?”
“Yes, and very effectually too; but you shall hear. The first thing to be done, is to dig a trench, or ditch, parallel to the general outline of the fortress, and at a distance of about six hundred yards from it. The earth flung up out of the trench forms a bank, or parapet, on the side next to the enemy, and is, therefore, a defence to the besiegers. You will remember, then, that the first and most important object to be attained in a siege, is to carry forward a trench up to the walls of the place: the quicker this is done the fewer lives will be lost on the part of the besiegers.”
“But what is the ditch for?”
“The ditch is cut that batteries may be the more safely erected there, to concentrate their fire upon the part to be attacked. This ditch is called the first parallel. The men and guns are comparatively safe in the ditch, when they would be swept away by the cannon of the besieged, if they remained on the surface of the ground.”
“Ay! we see now; digging the ditch is a capital plan. You told us about the first, and the second, and the third parallel before, but we shall understand you better now.”