At this moment, of course, we fervently adhere to the policy of the Allies—and for this, indeed, one can only say "Thank God!" The aims and objects of the allied nations are identical, and we have one common end in view: victory over our enemy at any cost. This fact is not based on any vague, cosmopolitan craving to win the approval of some wretched concert, but is founded on the most ardent and determined sense of patriotism.
Now let us consider what is just now the real position of Bulgaria, and how this position has been brought about. 'Yes, the incredible has happened, the liberated slave has turned against the hand that gave him freedom, the but recently enchained captive fights side by side with his oppressors, and uses his armed forces against his brothers. We turn away in horror, and cry "Treachery!" The cry is taken up and repeated, its echo resounds everywhere, and it seems at first sight as though nothing could be said in defence or justification of an act so inexcusable. Our indignation, indeed, is just; but before we condemn an entire nation, let us look round for a moment and consider whether we cannot point the finger of our scorn and contempt at an object more deserving of such feelings than an ignorant people victimised by falsehoods and intrigues, and drawn against its will into an adventure of which it is already tiring.
In the first place, European diplomacy, guided by Lord Beaconsfield, opposed Russia's imminent triumphant entry into Constantinople. In connection with this fact, I am tempted to recall the following incident.
Several years after the end of the war, ex-President Grant called on me in Paris, and put to me the following question:
"Can you explain how it happened that the Russians did not occupy Constantinople, when it was obviously entirely in their hands?"
"Alas!" I replied, "I have no pleasant explanation to offer. We never expected such a voluntary abdication of power. In fact, some of our military people telegraphed to Moscow, saying, 'To-morrow Constantinople will be occupied for several days.' The general conviction is that our Government, misled by news from abroad, telegraphed orders to our Generals not to advance."
General Grant, who was listening attentively, smiled, and said:
"Well, I can only say one thing. Had I been one of your Generals I should have put the order in my pocket, and opened it at Constantinople three or four days later!"
Soon after the Constantinople mistake we again foolishly yielded to the demands of the European Concert, when the San Stéfano Treaty was opposed, and once more this was a terrible blow to our patriotic feelings, and a real misfortune to Bulgaria.