Let me prove my case: In the treaty of San Stéfano, the Turkish Government entered into a direct and explicit obligation to Russia to guarantee the security of the Armenians.
Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stéfano runs thus:
"As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect without further delay the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians."
Now, it is obvious that this clause imposed clear and precise obligations not only upon Turkey, but also upon Russia. If the reforms were not carried out, if the security of the Armenians were not guaranteed, Russia would have been bound to interfere, and would have interfered, to compel the Turks to carry out their treaty obligations.
This article seemed to the British plenipotentiaries to give Russia a virtual protectorate over Armenia, and therefore they insisted upon striking it out. The poor Armenians were forbidden to look for their protection to the strong arm of the Tsar. The Turks were delivered from their express obligation to guarantee the security of their Armenian subjects, and it was calmly decreed that the Armenians should be content with Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. That clause ran as follows:
"The Sublime Porte engages to realise without delay those ameliorations and reforms which local needs require in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and the Kurds. It undertakes to make known, from time to time, the measures taken with this object to the Powers, who will watch over their application."
Mark the difference. In place of a positive obligation entered into with the only Power near enough and strong enough to enforce the fulfilment of treaty engagements, there was substituted this engagement, over the execution of which the Powers, in their beneficence, promised to watch: as the execution has never begun, the Powers were not overburdened with much "watching." "Waiting" rather expresses what they did—waiting for the Turks to begin the fulfilment of the promises which they made to collective Europe years and years ago. They are waiting still. Meanwhile the Armenians were massacred, as, for example, at Sassoun, and not there only. But even this did not exhaust the criminal responsibility of Lord Beaconsfield. He had taken Cyprus as a material pledge for the execution of reforms in Asiatic Turkey. But there were no reforms in Asiatic Turkey. The only effect of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was to increase the confidence of the Sultan that he could do as he pleased in Armenia, Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty notwithstanding.
England, therefore, was responsible in three ways. She destroyed the Russian guarantee exacted by the Treaty of San Stéfano. She framed the worthless "watching" clause of the Berlin Treaty, and then, to preclude all possibility of effective pressure upon the Turk, she concluded the Cyprus Convention, which established an illegal British protectorate over the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan.