Lord Beaconsfield said:
"Suppose the settlement of Europe had been limited to the mere Treaty of Berlin. What are the probable consequences which would then have occurred? In ten, fifteen, it might be twenty years [it has been exactly eighteen!] the power of Russia being revived, her resources having again resumed their general strength, some quarrel would again have occurred, Bulgarian or otherwise [Armenian this time], between Turkey and Russia, and in all probability the armies of Russia would have assaulted the Ottoman dominions both in Europe and Asia, enveloping with her armies the city of Constantinople and the powerful position which it occupies. Well, what would have been the probable conduct under these circumstances of the Government of this country?"
This was the vital question for Prince Lobanoff, and the answer to it has shaped the whole policy of Russia.
Lord Beaconsfield continued:
"Whoever might have been the Minister and whatever the party in power, the position of the Government would have been this. There must have been hesitation for a time, there must have been a want of decision and firmness, but no one could doubt that ultimately England would have said: 'This will never do; we must prevent the conquest of Asia Minor and must interfere in this matter to assist because of Russia.' No one, I am sure, in this country who merely considers this question can for a moment doubt that that must have been the ultimate policy of this country."
Therefore, he went on to explain (I summarise the points of a long speech), in order to remove any possible doubt on the subject, the voice of England should be clearly, firmly, and decidedly expressed in advance, and this he claimed he had effected by the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention. There has to be no more hesitating, doubting and considering "contingencies." England was, once for all, definitely committed to defend the Asiatic frontier of the Ottoman Empire against any advances of the Russian army in any quarrel, "Bulgarian or otherwise."
This, he declared, was "the ultimate policy" of England, and he embodied it for all men to see in the Cyprus Convention. Lord Salisbury had previously described that convention as an undertaking given "fully and unreservedly" to prevent any further encroachments by Russia upon Turkish territory in Asia.
That was plain speaking. The Convention of Cyprus, therefore, was a document prepared to prevent our taking any action for the protection of the Armenians. It meant war—war by England, by sea and land all round the world, against Russia if she advanced a single company of armed police into the valleys of Armenia. With this Convention still in force, who could blame Russia for not joining in operations against Abdul?
Of course I was told—even by Mr. Gladstone himself—that the Cyprus Treaty contained no obligation to protect the Assassin in Armenia except on condition of reforms, and that the Sultan had been informed long ago that the covenant fell to the ground by his breach of faith in not giving the reforms.
This, I confess, was news to me, and in Russia we knew nothing of any such abandonment of the Convention by the English Government.