I am not willing to say that Grant at this time had devised a plan for extended operations towards the South, but I am confident that he was studying his maps and measuring the comparative resources of the two armies long before his superiors had any definite ideas on the subject. I firmly believe that to him belongs the conception of that grand military movement which he so gloriously carried forward in person.

On the return of Smith from his expedition, Grant forwarded his report to General Halleck, and a day later, by permission, visited the headquarters of the commander of the department at St. Louis, in order to obtain permission to attack Fort Henry. Halleck was one of the high and mighty men, and his refusal was abrupt and sharp. Grant was no orator. He proffered his request in the fewest words that would express it; and he did not attempt to sustain his views by an argument. He was wounded in his feelings by the curtness of his superior, and returned to Cairo with the unpleasant impression that his commander regarded him as a tyro, capable of perpetrating the grossest military blunder.

But Grant had Fort Henry on the brain, and, in spite of his repulse, he could not be satisfied to leave with his superior the responsibility of neglecting to improve what he regarded as a golden opportunity. In the latter part of January he telegraphed to Halleck that, with his permission, he would take and hold Fort Henry, establish and hold a large camp there. A day later he followed up his application with a letter, demonstrating the practicability of the proposed enterprise, and showing the advantage to be gained by a prompt advance. His application was warmly seconded by Flag-officer Foote; and this time the desired permission was obtained. Grant was happy then; he had overcome the coldness of Halleck, and it only remained for him to justify his predictions.

Grant was on the most intimate terms of friendship with Foote, and these two gallant and devoted men worked harmoniously together to achieve a success. There was no bickering between them about precedence, for both of them sought only to serve the cause in which they had embarked. Halleck's detailed instructions arrived on the 1st of February, and, in view of the experience of others, it is almost a miracle that there was not a delay of a month, or at least of a week. Grant was a prompt man, and in spite of all the precedents made and provided for the occasion, he actually started from Cairo on the day after his orders reached him. His force, embarked in transports, consisted of seventeen thousand men, and Commodore Foote's squadron was composed of seven gunboats, only four of which, however, were iron-clads.

On the 4th of February the expedition arrived at the scene of operations. Grant had given McClernand the advance, and this officer landed his troops about eight miles below the fort. But the commanding general did not quite comprehend the situation, and he was not the man to work in the dark when light could be obtained. Going on board of one of the gunboats, he directed its captain to steam up the river, and under the guns of the fort, in order to draw its fire and test its weight of metal. The rebels fired upon the daring intruder, and a shot went through the steamer. The purpose of the general was gained, and he returned to his forces below, reembarked them, and again landed them just out of the reach of cannon shot, the range of which he had practically demonstrated.

The enemy were fully alive to the peril which menaced them, and made every preparation for a desperate resistance. Additional troops were ordered up by the railroads, and reserves from Fort Donelson stationed where they could be available. The Tennessee had overflowed its banks, and the country for miles around was inundated. Fort Henry was completely surrounded by water, and the movements of both armies were made with difficulty. But Grant, no more dismayed by flood than by fire, gave orders to post his troops so as to intercept any departures or arrivals of the enemy.

Before the investment of the fort, intelligence of the anticipated arrival of a large rebel force compelled Grant to hasten the attack, and at eleven o'clock, on the 6th of February, the army marched towards the rear of the fort, and the gunboats steamed up the river to engage the batteries. The intrepid old sea-dog opened fire upon the works, and in an hour and a half knocked them all to pieces, silencing every gun. General Tilghman surrendered to Commodore Foote without conditions; but only the commander, his staff, and sixty men were captured, the main body of the rebel army having been sent to Fort Donelson.

The floods of water and the miry condition of the roads prevented the army from reaching the rear of the fort in season to be of any service. The cavalry was sent in pursuit of the fleeing rebels, but they had gone too far to be overtaken. General Tilghman, it appeared, did not share the confidence of his superiors in the invulnerableness of his works, and early in the morning he had posted his entire garrison, with the exception of a force sufficient to work his guns, at some outworks two miles distant, and out of the reach of the shot and shell from the gunboats, where they could be hastened to a place of safety. Before the result of the battle with the gunboats was known, these forces were sent away, and no different action on the part of the Union general could have captured them.

The victory was a decided one, though the army was prevented from sharing in the glory of capturing the fort. The result filled the government of the Confederacy with dismay. One of its strong gates had been battered down, and the Tennessee was open to the navigation of those pestilent gunboats, which had already become the terror of Rebeldom. Prompt to assure the leaders of the Confederacy of the disaster which had overtaken them, Flag-officer Foote sent three of his "pets" up the river, which proceeded as far as Florence, Alabama, destroying the railroad bridge twenty-five miles above Fort Henry, capturing large quantities of stores, and burning many steamers and other boats.

The effect of this success was promptly realized in the sudden evacuation of Bowling Green; and thus two of the rebel strongholds were struck down by the same blow. But the full advantage of this capture was not to be realized until the Union army was ready to move in force towards the south. The victory was an easy one, very much to the astonishment of the naval and the military officers in command. Certainly the position was of importance enough for the Confederacy to have staked more upon it than it did.