Grant arrived at Pittsburg Landing March 17; but he established his headquarters at Savannah, nine miles below, in order to superintend the organization of troops arriving from Missouri, and because this point was more convenient for him to communicate with Buell. He visited the army daily, and kept himself thoroughly acquainted with all the details of the camp. But a question of rank having been raised at the front, he decided, two days before the great battle, to remove his headquarters to Pittsburg Landing, in order to obviate the difficulty. As he was about to carry out his purpose, he received a message from Buell, requesting him to remain at Savannah, where he should arrive on the following day, April 4. It was of the utmost consequence that he should see the commander of the army of the Cumberland at the earliest possible moment, for there had been frequent skirmishes along the line, and the period of actual operations could not be much longer delayed, even to please the autocrat at St. Louis.
Grant, having made his arrangements to meet Buell at Savannah on the 6th of April, went up to the camp. He rode to the front with Sherman, and both of them agreed that there was no danger of an immediate attack, though there had been a heavy reconnoissance by the enemy. As Grant was riding back to the Landing, his horse stumbled and fell, throwing his rider beneath him, and severely injuring him. He suffered great pain for several days, and was partially disabled for a week.
On Saturday, April 5, the cavalry of the rebels was very bold, but still it was not believed that a battle was imminent. The advance of Buell's army, in command of Nelson, arrived at Savannah on this day, and was sent up the river by General Grant, to a position five miles from Pittsburg Landing, on the other side of the Tennessee, in readiness to reënforce the army at the front. Grant was all ready to go to the scene of the expected battle, and only waited to keep his engagement with Buell.
[CHAPTER XVI.]
Wherein Captain Galligasken views the illustrious Soldier in the Battle of Shiloh, and corrects some popular Errors in regard to that savage Fight.
In approaching the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, I find myself coming to a point which envy, jealousy, and misrepresentation have battered against with the utmost fury. No action of the war has been so little understood, none so grossly misstated, none so thoroughly and maliciously criticised. It was one of the severest, if not the severest conflict of the whole war; but more doubt and uncertainty seem to hang over it than over any other event connected with the history of the national arms during the rebellion. There is no good reason that its facts should be so grossly perverted, nor that any of its details should be concealed, or apologized for.
Viewing General Grant as the central figure in this tremendous conflict, every word he spoke was the right word, every movement he made was the right one. I find nothing in his conduct that needs to be excused, nothing to be explained, and nothing to be undone. As in every other battle of the war in which he was engaged, he was heroic, self-possessed, skilful, and, by his personal influence and exertions, saved the hard-fought field on the first day. I do not mean to say that no mistakes were made; only that Grant did not make them. It is one of his crowning triumphs that he counteracted the errors of others, that he saved the army from the full consequences of the blunders, disobedience, and tardiness of subordinates, and of the partial demoralization among the raw troops. I am only surprised that we were not overwhelmed and driven into the Tennessee, instead of holding the ground at the end of that awful fight, which began at daylight and continued until night.