Our Standard-Bearer; Or, The Life of General Uysses S. Grant

by Oliver Optic

None for himself, strained in mind and muscle by cares and toils that would have overcome any other man; but a blessed thought for the poor wounded ones whom he had led to victory over the couch of pain and death!

At a celebration of Washington's birthday before Vicksburg, the company, of whom Grant was one, indulged freely in champagne, drinking patriotic toasts, suggested by the day. The general pushed aside a glass of the sparkling beverage intended for his use, and took up a glass of Mississippi water.

"This suits the matter in hand," said he, glancing at the opaque fluid in the glass. "Drink this toast: God gave us Lincoln and Liberty: let us fight for both."

President Lincoln quaintly hinted his disbelief in the popular rumors of Grant's intemperance, when, after the battle of Shiloh, he said, "I wish all our generals would drink Grant's whiskey."

Before Vicksburg Grant stood alone. The government and the people were more than doubtful of the result. McClernand, Hunter, Fremont, and McClellan were mentioned as his successors. Senators and representatives urged Grant's removal, and one of his corps commanders was plotting for his place. Still he was struggling for success, while friends wavered, and enemies cried out against him. To his heavy load of cares and trials was added this heaviest burden of all—the dread of being removed before he could carry out the great design which had been born in his busy brain.

This great design set at nought all the formulæ of the military schools, and was in violation of all the known laws of strategy; but it was not a new idea. Long before canals and operations, in accordance with the recognized rules of warfare, had been discarded as impracticable, he had cherished it as a last resort. The military engineers of the Confederacy were at least the equals, as scientific men, of those of the Union. With every means and material in abundance, they had fortified Vicksburg on the most approved plans, and, aided by the immense natural advantages of the position, had succeeded in building up a "Gibraltar" which could not be captured. To them the issue was no less than the very existence of the Confederacy; for, cut off from its supplies in Texas, its conquest was only a question of time. These engineers made sure that they had not deceived themselves. They piled up defences, and extended their batteries, until Gibraltar and Sevastopol were beggared in their strength in comparison with Vicksburg.

Doubtless, measured by the ordinary rules of military security, and by the ability of any force governed by the recognized canons of warfare, the Confederate engineers were fully justified in their perfect confidence. All the communications behind Vicksburg were in their hands. No base of supplies could be established below or in the rear of the stronghold. Impenetrable swamps and morasses defended it above, for they afforded no resting place whereon an army could stand. The fortified heights of Walnut Hills frowned for miles above the submerged lands on the Yazoo. The whole strength of the Rebellion was in the rear of the city, and armies could be rushed in upon a hostile force gathered there, by the railroads. To any other man than Grant it would have been a hopeless task; but he set at nought the rules of war under which Vicksburg was safe.

He announced his plan to his generals. They were startled. All opposed it. He intended to march through a portion of Louisiana to a point on the Mississippi, below Vicksburg, cross the river, and strike the Gibraltar in the rear. The gunboats were to run by the batteries, and assist in the operations below. The scheme was full of peril. To transport the army below Vicksburg was to separate it from any base of supplies; in short, to cut his own communications, to place himself in just the situation which the rebels would have selected for him. He did not call a council of war, and argue the question with his generals; he simply made up his mind to do it. Sherman, Logan, McPherson, Wilson, all opposed the plan when it came to their knowledge.

Sherman, his cherished friend, his indomitable supporter in whatever he did, whether he agreed or not with his chief, declared that the only way to take Vicksburg was by going back to Memphis, and following up the movement which they had attempted the preceding autumn. But Grant was confident that a backward movement would be fatal to himself, that the country would not endure anything that looked like another reverse, and he adhered to his own plan. Sherman then wrote out a formal paper, setting forth the advantages of his own plan very ably, and in close accord with all military rules, and sent it to Grant's chief of staff. It was given to the general, and he read it carefully, and then put it in his trousers pocket. As Sherman had requested in the paper, he made no reply to the argument; in fact, never mentioned it. Weeks after, when prominent men in the army gave Sherman the credit of the plan, he stated these facts.

The disapproval of his ablest generals could not deter Grant from his purpose. Even Sherman, as careful of the reputation of his chief as of the glory of the cause he had espoused, failed to shake his inflexible will. The army was marched and ferried from Milliken's Bend to De Shroons' Landing, three or four miles below Grand Gulf. The gunboats, with a fleet of barges laden with provisions for the troops, ran the gantlet of the Vicksburg batteries with comparatively slight loss. Such a bold movement appalled the crews of the transports, and only a few of them were willing to undergo the exposure. But Grant appealed to the army, wherein were to be found the representatives of every trade and profession. And engineers, firemen, pilots, and deck hands were superabundantly supplied. Through the rain of shot and shell they passed, and the army and the navy were gathered together again in the enemy's country. A new era in the campaign had been inaugurated.