"The Philosophy of the Mormons is IRRATIONAL."
What the author means by this proposition is, that it is "irrational" to believe all substance material. To substantiate this proposition he sets out in quest of proof. An immaterial substance is the thing wanted. No other proof will answer. If he can prove the existence of an immaterial substance his point is gained,—his proposition established, and the irrationality of the material theory will be demonstrated.
As we are about to launch forth into the wide field of existence in search of an "immaterial substance," it may be well to have the term correctly defined, so as to be able to distinguish such a substance from matter. It is of the utmost importance that every reasoner should clearly define the terms he employs. Two contending parties may use the same word in altogether different meanings; and each draw correct conclusions from the meaning which he attaches to the same word; hence arise endless disputes. As we have no confidence in the immaterial theory, we shall let the immaterialist define his own terms. We shall give,
Taylder's Definition.—"What is meant by an immaterial substance is merely this, that something exists which is not matter and is evidently distinct from matter, which is not dependent on matter for its existence, and which possesses properties and qualities entirely different from those possessed by matter." (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 14.)
This definition of an "immaterial substance" is ambiguous. It needs another definition to inform us what he means. Does he mean that ALL of "the properties and qualities" of an immaterial substance are "entirely different from those possessed by matter;" and that it possesses NO properties in common with matter? Or does he mean that while it "possesses SOME properties and qualities entirely different" from matter it inherits OTHERS in common with matter? If the latter be his meaning, we see no reason for calling any substance "immaterial." Iron possesses SOME properties and qualities "entirely different" from all other kinds of matter, and other properties it inherits in common with every other kind. Shall we therefore say that iron is not matter? Among the various kind of matter, each has its distinct properties, and its common properties; and notwithstanding each possesses "entirely different" properties and qualities from all other kinds, yet each is called matter because it possesses some properties in common with all other kinds. Hence the term matter should be given to all substances which possess any properties in common, however wide they may differ in other respects. A substance to be immaterial must possess NO properties or qualities in common with matter. All its qualities must be entirely distinct and different. It is to be regretted that our opponent has not defined an immaterial substance more clearly. As he is ambiguous in his definition, we shall presume that he entertains the same views as the modern advocates of immaterialism generally entertain.
That celebrated writer, Isaac Taylor, says,—"a disembodied spirit, or we should rather say, an unembodied spirit, or sheer mind, is NOWHERE. Place is a relation belonging to extension; and extension is a property of matter; but that which is wholly abstracted from matter, and in speaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith, can in itself be subjected to none of its conditions; and we might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red, or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is here or there. It is only in a popular and improper sense that any such affirmation is made concerning the Infinite Spirit, or that we speak of God as everywhere present." * * * "Using the term as we use them of ourselves, God is not here or there." * * * "When we talk of an absolute immateriality," continues this author, "and wish to withdraw mind altogether from matter, we must no longer allow ourselves to imagine that it is, or can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of relationship to the visible and extended universe." (Taylor's "Physical Theory of Another Life." Chapter II.) Dr. Good says, "The metaphysical immaterialists of modern times freely admit that the mind has NO PLACE of existence, that it does exist NOWHERE; while at the same time they are compelled to allow that the immaterial Creator or universal spirit exists EVERYWHERE, substantially as well as virtually." (Good's "Book of Nature," Series III., Lecture I.)
Dr. Abercrombie, in speaking upon matter and mind, says, that "in as far as our utmost conception of them extends, we have no grounds for believing that they have anything in common." (Abercrombie on the "Intellectual Powers." Part I. Sec. I.)
With these definitions, we shall follow our opponent in his researches after an "immaterial substance." After taking a minute survey of man, he believes he has found in his composition, and in connexion with his bodily organization, something immaterial. He says, "the spirit is the purely immaterial part, which is capable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of the body."
"The body is that material part, 'formed out of the dust of the ground,' and is the medium through which the mind is manifested." (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 8.)
That the mind or spirit, "is capable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of the body," we most assuredly believe; but that it is "immaterial" we deny; and it remains for Mr. Taylder to prove its immateriality. His first proof is founded on his own assertion, that "mind is simple, not compounded." If this assertion be admitted as true, it affords not the least evidence for the immateriality of mind. Every material atom is simple, not compounded. Is it, therefore, not matter? Must each simple, uncompounded elementary atom be immaterial?