Children standing—Doris Harcourt, Olivia Harcourt

Children seated—Barbara Harcourt, Anthony Asquith


At this Conference, perhaps more significant than anything that was said or done was the presence of General Botha as prime minister of the self-governing colony of the Transvaal. It was only five years since Botha, as commander-in-chief of the Boers who had held out to the last, had laid down his arms. Now he sat in the highest councils of the Empire, saying little, studying his fellow-ministers and the common problems, and impressing all by his strong common sense and his frank loyalty. His presence there was due to the courage and confidence which had been displayed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. One of the first steps taken by Campbell-Bannerman's Ministry in 1906 had been to grant to the Transvaal full and immediate self-government without any intervening period of half-freedom. The policy had been a bold one. To a German empire-framer it would have appeared incredible folly. The king had remonstrated against it, the leader of the Opposition had termed it dangerous and reckless, Mr Kipling had hurled sonnets against it. But the Government had stood firm, with the result here seen, and with still greater justification to follow. In this and the following Conference General Botha manifested a special regard for his Canadian colleague, like himself a leader from a minority race. Undoubtedly Wilfrid Laurier's example, Canada's example, counted much in making clear to Louis Botha the path which led to loyal and lasting co-operation.

The centralization policy found a new champion at the Conference of 1911.

Sir Joseph Ward, Mr Seddon's successor as prime minister of New Zealand, submitted some months in advance a proposal for an Imperial Council of State advisory to the British Government, and then, having meantime been persuaded to go the whole road, made a speech in favour of a central parliament. The proposal met with still less favour than before. British, Australian, South African, Newfoundland, and Canadian prime ministers joined in pronouncing it unworkable and undesirable. 'The proposal seems to me to be absolutely impracticable,' declared Sir Wilfrid Laurier. 'It is not a practical scheme; our present system of responsible government has not broken down,' agreed Premier Fisher of Australia. 'The creation of some body with centralized authority over the whole Empire would be a step entirely antagonistic to the policy of Great Britain which has been so successful in the past, and which has undoubtedly made the Empire what it is to-day. It is the policy of decentralization which has made the Empire—the power granted to its various peoples to govern themselves,' added Premier Botha of South Africa. 'Any scheme of representation—no matter what you may call it, parliament or council—of the overseas Dominions must [give them] so very small a representation that it would be practically of no value,' said Premier Morris of Newfoundland. Mr Asquith summed up:

We cannot, with the traditions and history of the British Empire behind us, either from the point of view of the United Kingdom, or from the point of view of our self-governing Dominions, assent for a moment to proposals which are so fatal to the very fundamental conditions on which our empire has been built up and carried on.... It would impair, if not altogether destroy, the authority of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war, and, indeed, all those relations with foreign powers, necessarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial Government, subject to its responsibility to the Imperial Parliament. That authority cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the Cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body—it does not matter by what name you call it for the moment—clothed with the functions and the jurisdiction which Sir Joseph Ward proposed to invest it with, would, in our judgment, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government.... So far as the Dominions are concerned, this new machine could impose upon the Dominions by the voice of a body in which they would be in a standing minority (that is part of the case), in a small minority, indeed, a policy of which they might all disapprove, a policy which in most cases would involve expenditure, and an expenditure which would have to be met by the imposition on a dissentient community of taxation by its own government.

Mr Asquith's statement that 'that authority cannot be shared' has sometimes been taken to mean that the United Kingdom could not and would not admit the Dominions to a share in the control of foreign policy. As the context and later action showed, however, it was to sharing control with a new super-parliament that the prime minister of the United Kingdom, in common with the prime ministers of every Dominion except New Zealand, expressed his opposition. Later in the Conference a further, if far from final, step was taken towards sharing control with the Dominions. Upon Mr Fisher's demand that the Dominions should be consulted in international agreements such as the Declaration of London and the conventions of the Hague Conference, it was agreed unanimously that, at further Hague Conferences and elsewhere when time and subject-matter permitted, this would be done. Sir Wilfrid Laurier agreed with this proposal, though stating his view that in such negotiations the United Kingdom should be given a free hand. Some greater share in foreign policy, most nationalists and imperialists alike agreed, the Dominions must possess. The real question was, whether they should seek it through a central body in which they would have a minority representation, and whose functions it was impossible to define without serious infringement of the existing powers of the Dominions, or whether they were to secure it along the line so long pursued, of independence in what was overwhelmingly the prime concern of each separate state, plus co-operation in what was distinctly of common interest.

Hardly had preferential trade as a mooted topic receded into the background when the question of Canada's share in the defence of the Empire came to the front and took on a new urgency and a new interest.

The forces of Canada for land defence had been made much more effective since the twentieth century began. The permanent militia had been largely increased; engineer, medical, army-service, and ordnance corps had been organized or extended; rifle associations and cadet corps had been encouraged; new artillery armament had been provided; reserves of ammunition and equipment had been built up; a central training-camp had been established; the period and discipline of the annual drill had been increased; the administration had been thoroughly reorganized. In 1911 over six times as much was spent upon the militia as in 1896. Though the service was still very far from ideal efficiency, there was no question that it had been greatly improved.