Shortly thereafter the political atmosphere was considerably disturbed by the Crete affair, just as Chevket Pasha had foreseen. The Greek army had entered politics and dominated the Government. It caused several changes of ministers and forced the King to consent to the summoning of a National Assembly consisting of twice as many delegates as there were members in Parliament. Crete also insisted upon sending delegates, which would have been tantamount to incorporating itself as part of Greece politically.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs frankly told the ambassadors of all the leading Powers, as well as the Greek minister, that if the Greek National Assembly admitted delegates from Crete, Turkey would regard that as a casus belli. There was a rumor at the same time that Bulgaria was preparing to take advantage of the crisis to make war on Turkey, either by uniting with Greece or in conjunction with some of the other Balkan States. The Minister of Foreign Affairs had managed well, and the four big Powers, England, Russia, France, and Italy, bestirred themselves and the situation was allayed for the time.
Greece had purchased from Italy a man-of-war of about ten thousand tons, which was being fitted and armored for delivery within six months. To offset this augmentation of the Greek navy, already stronger than the Turkish, Turkey wanted to purchase a man-of-war of sufficient size to outclass the one being fitted for Greece. The Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me with a memorandum of the size of the ship and the strength of the armament desired, together with a statement that the object of the Ottoman Government in the purchase of it was not to make war, but to safeguard the peace of Turkey and possibly of Europe. It was thought that the moral effect upon Greece of such a purchase would prevent her from taking any action that would cause war.
I cabled this proposal in detail to Secretary Knox, and requested a reply by cable. I knew that we had several ships that would probably answer the requirements of Turkey, and I thought that, aside from the moral effect this might have in preventing a war between Turkey and Greece, it would enable us to substitute a new ship of our own for an old one. It was not a question of price, as Turkey had put aside sufficient money to pay for such a ship.
A few days later Chevket Pasha also called on me, and again assured me that the purchase was designed to have an immediate effect upon the maintenance of peace, and that the people of Turkey would be forever grateful to the United States if we should sell them the ship.
But after the lapse of a week or more, I finally received a negative answer from the State Department, saying that such a sale could not be made without the authority of Congress. This, of course, I knew; but since the transaction would have given us the opportunity to add a new ship to replace the other, I thought such legislation might readily have been obtained. The Turkish Government then made application to Germany, and that country seized the opportunity further to cement its friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire, which later had such an important bearing in the World War.
About a year after this Crete affair, Chevket Pasha was assassinated as he was coming out of the Sublime Porte. No greater loss could have befallen Turkey than the removal at that time of her greatest general and most enlightened statesman. He was the best-informed Turkish statesman I have ever known, with a clear and correct view of the entire European situation. What the conspiracy was behind this shooting was never brought to light.
The affairs of Crete at that time were in the hands of the energetic and brilliant leader who has since come to be regarded as one of the foremost statesmen of all Europe, Eleutherios Venizelos. At the Paris Peace Conference his recognition was complete. The Greeks, however, have always shown themselves to be a fickle and ungrateful people, and from the time of Socrates have turned against their foremost philosophers and statesmen, and their attitude toward Venizelos is the most recent illustration of those traits. Venizelos is practically a refugee from his own country and at this writing is visiting our country to study American institutions.
The main reason I accepted the post at Turkey for the third time was to secure the legal status and rights of American institutions under definite laws in the new régime. The Turks had promulgated a law, known as the "Law of Associations," under the ingenious restrictions of which they sought to place all foreign institutions. That would have given the Ottoman authorities, both civil and judicial, the power so to impede the work of these institutions as to prevent them from functioning. I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that the Law of Associations was contrary to the acquired rights of the institutions, which had been legally recognized for many years, and taking section by section I showed him the inapplicability of it to these institutions. After months of negotiations, as usual in Turkey, I succeeded in getting a decision from the Council of Ministers exempting foreign institutions of a religious, educational, or benevolent character.