On my return to America in the fall of 1913, there were two notable questions that occupied the attention of President Wilson and Congress, in which as a private citizen I had taken some part. I was soon invited by the National Republican Club to take part in a luncheon discussion of "Present World Problems," and this enabled me to discuss a subject that had resulted in a plank in the National Platform of the Progressive Party, "that American ships engaged in coastwise trade shall pay no tolls." As this question did not arise in the New York State campaign, I had had no occasion to discuss it except on one occasion when I was asked what my stand was upon that subject, and I plainly stated that I did not favor the remission of tolls, as it conflicted with the spirit, if not with the express wording, of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and that I would only favor it in the event the question were left to arbitration and decided in our favor. In this discussion I went somewhat fully into the subject, making it clear why I was not in favor of free tolls, and why I supported the President in the stand that he had taken for repeal of the act that freed our coastwise ships from such tolls.
Others who spoke at this luncheon on various phases of the general problem were William L. Mackenzie King, at this writing the Premier of Canada, and Miss Mabel T. Boardman, representing the American Red Cross.
In April the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals held hearings upon an act to amend the Panama Canal Act repealing the provision providing for freeing coastwise American ships from tolls. Upon invitation I appeared before this committee and supported the position that the President had taken, in opposition to the provisions of the platform of his party, for the repeal of the free tolls clause. Upon the urgent request of the President, the repealing act was passed. Some of our ablest Senators, regardless of party, took opposing sides upon this question. Elihu Root, who was then Senator, presented, in my judgment, the most convincing argument and the ablest speech of his distinguished career in the Senate, advocating the repeal of the free tolls clause.
Another international subject which I was carefully studying at this time was our relations with Mexico. I felt then, as I do now, that our Government has often been badly served and wrongly advised in regard to affairs in Mexico. I suggested to the President that he should send to Mexico a commission of experienced men who could in a comparatively short time lay before him the true conditions as a guide for our governmental action. I pointed out that under circumstances different, but no less perplexing, this plan had been adopted by Cleveland during the Venezuela trouble, and that the appointment of that commission, of which Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court was chairman, had hastened the solution. When the idea of the United States sending a commission such as I recommended became publicly known, it was favorably received by General Huerta, the then President of Mexico, as well as by Carranza. The appointment of such a commission would have had the additional effect of offsetting the pressure in Congress for intervention, and several of the leading Senators expressed themselves as favoring it.
When storm clouds are rushing across the sky, it is very difficult to foretell where the lightning will strike. It is needless here to discuss the professed but spurious reasons why Italy declared war upon Turkey in 1911. It was evident that no casus belli existed in any international sense. The naked fact was that Italy determined to have a slice of northern Africa, and was favored in that craving by several of the Great Powers, chiefly to prevent Germany from getting a foothold on the Mediterranean. I knew from my observations in Turkey that this aggressive action on the part of Italy would far transcend the interest of either Italy or Turkey, and would inevitably arouse the restless Balkan Powers to action.
In a communication that I sent to Secretary of State Knox on September 29, 1911, attention was directed to what would probably be the outcome of this action on the part of Italy; also that the Hague Treaty not only sanctioned, but made it morally incumbent upon Powers that were strangers to the dispute, to tender their good offices for the purpose of a peaceful adjustment. Just because the United States could not be accused of having any direct interest, such an offer could have been made with best grace by our country. If ever there had been a war of conquest, that was one. One of the London papers had frankly criticized Italy's precipitous act as that of "pirate, brigand, and buccaneer."
In an article written for "The Outlook" following a number of public addresses upon the same subject, I pointed out that Turkey, both immediately before and since hostilities began, had appealed to the Christian nations of the world, who were co-signatories with her of the Hague Treaty, to use their good offices for peace, but the Christian nations had declined to act. In this article I stated: