The day before this, while I was paying a visit at the Hotel Continental, I met Jane Addams and Lillian Wald, and with them was Alexander Kerensky, the former Premier of Russia, They asked me to meet Kerensky, which I did. He proved to be not at all the kind of man in appearance that I had pictured. He did not resemble the Russian type. He was clean-shaven, rather spare, a little above medium height, and seemed about forty years of age. He looked more like a student than like a leader who had stood in the storm-center of political turmoil.
Kerensky told me that he did not believe in Kolschak, principally because he regarded him as a tool of the Britain and Russian nobility. Kerensky expressed himself as opposed to having the Allies recognize Kolschak unless it was conditioned on definite guarantees that a free democratic election be held so that the people might decide what form of government they desired.
The following day, Dr. Dluski, the Polish peace delegate, together with M. Lieberman, a Jewish member of the Polish Diet, called upon me to explain, if not justify, the Polish pogroms, evidently because of the great publicity that had been given thereto by the mass meeting in New York. The resolutions passed by that meeting, and presented to the President, had appeared in dispatches to European papers.
We left Paris for Brest on May 30th. The Mount Vernon, which was scheduled to sail on the following day, had postponed sailing until June 3d. It carried some five thousand officers and men of the Sixth Division. Dr. Mezes and his wife were also on board. Dr. Mezes, who is a brother-in-law of Colonel House, organized the group of experts, of which he was chairman, which had rendered such valuable service to the Commission. We were all very comfortably provided for on the ship, and it was most interesting to observe the system and order with which the five thousand officers and men were taken care of. They were a jolly lot, happy to return home, and without exception conducted themselves in a correct and orderly manner. We had a delightful crossing; the weather was fine and the sea was calm.
Shortly after my return to the United States, the League to Enforce Peace called a meeting of the Executive Council to determine what action it could best take to further the ratification of the treaty which was now being vigorously debated in the Senate. It was decided that Mr. Vance McCormick and I should be a committee to confer with the President. We subsequently desired to add Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard University, to our number, provided it would be agreeable to the President, which Mr. McCormick was to ascertain when arranging for the appointment. The President designated August 6th as the day on which he would see us, and accordingly Dr. Lowell, Mr. McCormick, the Secretary of the League, Dr. Short, and I went to the White House.
President Wilson assured us that, while he was somewhat tired, he felt in good condition. He said he had had a number of conferences with individual Senators who had objected to the ratification of the treaty, and that he had given them explanations regarding the main points in dispute, namely, Article X, guaranteeing against external aggression; Article XXI, providing that nothing in the Covenant should be deemed to affect the validity of the Monroe Doctrine; and Article I, providing that any member of the League may, after two years' notice, withdraw from the League. These were the main subjects covered by the reservations formulated by the moderate group headed by Senators Kellogg and McCumber.
We suggested that it might be of good result if the President could in some public and formal way make his explanations and interpretations regarding these points. The question was how this could best be done. The President believed it would be preferable if one of the Senators of the opposition addressed to him a letter of inquiry, so framed as to enable the President to give his views. It was then understood that Dr. Lowell, Mr. McCormick, and I should confer with Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader of the minority of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who could advise us as to what member of the Republican majority on the committee it would be best for us to confer with.
After our conference with the President, we went to the Senate and found the Committee on Foreign Relations in session, examining Secretary of State Lansing. Senator Hitchcock suggested that we call on Senator McCumber, but as he was not then in Washington, Dr. Lowell and I called on Senator Kellogg. The latter told us what we already knew, namely, that he was in favor of the League and was scheduled to make his speech in the Senate advocating the ratification of the treaty with the reservations his group had formulated, which reservations he felt confident were not in the nature of amendments, but interpretative only, and therefore would not require resubmission either to the Plenary Session or to Germany. Dr. Lowell and I outlined our plan regarding the letter to the President, asking for his interpretation of the articles above referred to. While Senator Kellogg personally favored this plan, he said he would first have to confer with the members of his group, and he believed they would be favorably inclined. We then inquired whether the President's interpretations and clarifications might not serve the purpose of making the reservations unnecessary. The Senator said "no," but that the reservations could recite the fact that they were based upon the President's interpretations. We arranged that Senators Kellogg and Hitchcock should confer upon the subject with a view of preparing such a tentative letter of inquiry which might be shown to the President in advance, and to which the President could reply, giving his interpretations.