Right Above Race

by Otto H. Kahn

It cannot be admitted therefore that the fact of the Russian mobilization made it a necessity for you to precipitate war, especially on the very day when Austria, who was in a far more exposed position than you, declared herself ready at last, notwithstanding the Russian mobilization, to enter into direct diplomatic discussion with Russia.

If Germany had waited but three days after that declaration by her ally, before delivering her ultimatum to Russia, either the war would have been avoided altogether, or Russia would have had to face the world as the aggressor, with all the forces of what Bismarck termed "imponderabilia" against her. And it would be an insult to Germany's efficiency to question that she could have found measures short of rushing into war, to meet and offset for another few days the menace of Russian mobilization—apart from the fact that there is some reason to suspect that this Russian mobilization on the German frontier was deliberately provoked by certain Machiavellian manœuvres in Berlin.

On the 30th and 31st of July, respectively, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed as follows to the English ambassador in Berlin for transmission to the Imperial Chancellor:

"... You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good relations with England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. If we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object his Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will....

"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto....

"I said to the German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go to the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it, his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; otherwise, I told the German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in."

Is this the language of one seeking a quarrel? Why did not Germany act upon the suggestions put forth so urgently, ringing so manifestly true and bearing so evidently the stamp of good faith? Why was the calamity of war thrust upon the world in such hot haste, that you did not even previously inform, far less consult, your then allies, the Italians, in spite of the provisions of the Triple Alliance?

Is it not proved by declarations of Giolitti—certainly no enemy to Germany—before the Italian Parliament some six months back, that Austria wanted to make war upon Servia as much as two years ago, that is to say, long before the assassination of the Austrian heir-apparent afforded the pretext for an ultimatum which spelled war? I know sufficient of the sentiment prevailing in England and France before the war, as well as of the tendencies of the political leaders and other leading men in those countries, to be absolutely positive that, apart from a few individuals given to noise-making, but not possessing weight or real influence, the people and the Governments of France and England were very far indeed from wanting war.

On the other hand, I agree with you in believing that the Pan-Slavist party in Russia did plan to bring on war. However, they did not want it yet and it is altogether doubtful whether they would have succeeded in their design had they been met by a firm, wise and conciliatory policy on the part of Germany and Austria.

These opponents (the Russians), by themselves, as results thus far have shown, and as seemed evident in advance to sober observers, you need never to have considered as your peers in a military sense.