Excluding the revolution by which the Haitian yoke was thrown off in 1844 and that of 1863-65, which expelled the Spaniards, there have occurred in the seventy years of Dominican independence no less than twenty-three successful revolutions. One occurred in each of the years 1848, 1844, 1849, 1857 and 1864, three in 1865, one each in 1866, 1867 and 1873, three in 1876, one each in 1877, 1878, 1879, 1899 and 1902, two in 1903 and one each in 1912 and 1914. At times hardly had a revolution proved successful when a counter-revolution broke out and secured the victory. The longest intermissions were from 1879 to 1899 when the party of the dictator Heureaux was in power, and from 1903 to 1912, when the indirect protection of the United States was sufficient to sustain the government.

These were the successful revolutions; the unsuccessful insurrections are innumerable. It has been unfortunate for the credit of Santo Domingo that almost every little shooting affray is classed as an insurrection or revolution. Most of these unsuccessful uprisings have been unimportant excursions into the country by some disaffected local chief and a handful of followers, the band being promptly rounded up or scattered by government forces or induced to come in by promise of a job or some other consideration.

The circumstance that the provincial governors found it to their advantage to have disturbances in their district explains many of the smaller commotions. Upon the outbreak of an insurrection or before the threat of an outbreak the authorities in the capital would authorize the provincial governor to recruit troops and draw funds for their payment. The governor would do so, but if two or three thousand men had been authorized he would raise only two or three hundred and forget to account for the balance of the money. The suppression of the "revolution" would thus benefit both his military reputation and his pocketbook. Governors were therefore prone to exaggerate rumors of insurrection and sometimes themselves sent out men to fire a few shots in the woods and create alarm.

Other insurrections have been fierce and formidable and some administrations were obliged to engage in constant warfare in order to maintain themselves. A serious unsuccessful insurrection was that led by Gen. Casimiro de Moya against Heureaux in 1886, which lasted six months. The most widespread was that of Jimenez against the Morales government, lasting from December, 1903, to May, 1904, and during which the insurgents gained possession of practically the entire Republic. Other serious outbreaks occurred in 1904, 1905, 1906, 1909, 1911, 1913 and 1916. The fires smouldered constantly, especially in the Cibao, which raises the largest crops of everything, including revolutions.

The effect of such continuous commotion has been most disastrous to the country and the people at large. This is all the more saddening when it is considered that, less than ten per cent of the people took part in the disturbances. Revolutions, successful and unsuccessful, have been fought to a finish with less than a thousand men on either side. Ninety per cent of the population are law-abiding citizens who would like nothing better than to be let alone and permitted to pursue their vocations in peace. The other ten per cent were not entirely to blame: they have been the victims of their environment.

Not only have the revolutionary disturbances caused enormous indirect loss to the country through paralyzation of agriculture, arrest of development and loss of credit, but they have also been a large direct expense. A considerable portion of every budget was devoted to appropriations for the purchase of war material and the maintenance of the military and naval establishment. When uprisings occurred the additional amounts necessary for their suppression have been taken from other appropriations, those for public works usually being the first to be cancelled. If the uprisings became serious the other appropriations of the budget were reduced by fifty or even seventy-five per cent until all the available cash was devoted to war purposes. In 1903 military and naval expenditures absorbed 71.7 per cent of the Republic's disbursements, and in 1904 72.6 per cent. At such times the government was reduced to a desperate struggle for existence; the loss of the custom-houses in power of the insurgents made its position still more precarious; it contracted loans on ruinous terms; it neglected its foreign obligations and paid its employees in promissory notes and even in postage stamps, which they would then peddle about the streets. Under such conditions it is natural that nothing was left for public improvements. Even under the peaceful administration of Heureaux a disproportionate part of the national funds was expended for military purposes and three gunboats were acquired and maintained, but not a single mile of improved road was laid out.

With the American military occupation political conditions in the Dominican Republic have radically changed. The system of waging political campaigns by force of arms has stopped abruptly and absolutely. Revolutions have become a matter of history. Ballots will hereafter take the place of bullets, and politics will be conducted in the same manner as in other orderly countries. Evolution, not revolution, will be the characteristic of the future.

CHAPTER XX

LAW AND JUSTICE

Audiencia of Santo Domingo.—Legal system.—Judicial organization.—Observance of laws.—Prisons.—Character of offenses.