On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right of the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. It is also inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps as north of Armentières—only one of its Divisions was—while the II Corps was certainly too closely pressed to detach any troops to the north as depicted in the diagram.
In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the Army, the troops of General von Beseler had opened the battle on the Yser. During its advance northwards to cross the Yser at the appointed places the III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition east of the river-barrier. The men knew they were on the decisive wing of the attack, and they pushed ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid assault the 4th Ersatz Division captured Westende from the Belgians, although a gallant defence was put up, and in spite of the fact that British torpedo-boats and cruisers took part in the action from the sea with their heavy artillery[21] both during the advance and the fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve Division deployed to attack a strongly entrenched hostile position. The 3rd Reserve Jäger Battalion captured the obstinately defended village of St. Pierre Cappelle after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the main body of the division succeeded in pushing forward to the neighbourhood of Schoore. The 6th Reserve Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, also closed with the enemy. It captured Leke, and Keyem, defended by the 4th Belgian Division; but even this Brandenburg Division, for all its war experience, found the task of forcing the crossings over the Yser too much for it.
The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing us a thousand or two thousand yards nearer the Yser, but it had shown that the fight for the river line was to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the highest possible price. Four lines of trenches had been dug, and it could be seen that every modern scientific resource had been employed in putting the villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state of defence. A great number of guns, very skilfully placed and concealed, shelled the ground for a considerable distance east of the river, and in addition to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy naval guns from the sea. Battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank of the 4th Ersatz Division with their fire, and the British had even brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats close inshore.[22] They used a great quantity of ammunition, but the effect of it all was only slight, for the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and indicated bad observation. It became still more erratic when our long-range guns were brought into action against the British Fleet. Detachments of the 4th Ersatz Division had to be echeloned back as far as Ostend, in order to defend the coast against hostile landings. During the day the General Commanding the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the 4th Ersatz Division to cross the Yser at Nieuport, on account of the heavy fire from the British naval guns, but to make it pass with the main body of the Corps behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose area the fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The Ersatz Division was informed accordingly. On the 19th another effort would have to be made to force the crossings of the river by frontal attack, for everywhere to the south strong opposition had been encountered. From near Dixmude French troops carried on the line of the compact Belgian Army. It was against these that the new Reserve Corps were now advancing.
On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th October a strong attack was delivered from the west by the 4th Belgian Division, and from the south-west by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a brigade of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, against Keyem, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. They were driven back after heavy fighting. During the 19th the southern wing of the Brandenburg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing nearer the river and, on its left, part of the artillery of the XXII Reserve Corps came into action in support of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve Corps, which until that day had been fighting unassisted.
On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed on the whole front of the Fourth Army. The XXII Reserve Corps advanced on Beerst and Dixmude and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve Corps. In front of it lay the strong bridge-head of Dixmude, well provided with heavy guns. The whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed into battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th Reserve Division the 209th Reserve Regiment late in the evening took Handzaeme after severe street fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the village of Gits, whilst Cortemarck was evacuated by the enemy during the attack. The 46th Reserve Division in a running fight crossed the main road to Thourout, north of Roulers, and by the evening had arrived close to Staden. Heavy street fighting in the latter place continued during the night: the enemy, supported by the population, offered strong resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued behind our front lines, endangering the cohesion of the attacking troops, but never to a serious extent.
The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition at Rumbeke, south-east of Roulers; but all the enemy’s efforts were in vain, and the 233rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its Corps Commander, General von Hügel, forced its way through the rows of houses, many of which were defended with light artillery and machine-guns. A very heavy fight took place for the possession of Roulers, which was stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from holes in the roofs and windows, and concealed mines exploded among the advancing troops. In spite of all this, by 5 P.M. Roulers was taken by the 233rd, 234th and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking from north, east and south respectively. Further to the south, after a small skirmish with British cavalry, the 52nd Reserve Division reached Morslede, its objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII Reserve Corps had come into contact with the 3rd British Cavalry Division which tried to hold up the Corps in an advanced position at Rolleghem-Cappelle. After a lively encounter the British cavalry was thrown back on to the 7th British Division, which held a strong position about Dadizeele.[23]
Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation had been considerably cleared up, in so far as we now knew that the Belgians, French and British not only held the Yser and the Ypres canal, but also the high ground east and north-east of Ypres. Everything pointed to the fact that an unexpectedly strong opponent was awaiting us in this difficult country, and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg’s Army. In the meantime the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, after a discussion at Army Headquarters with General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, decided to renew the attack, as the left wing of the Fourth Army had now come up on his immediate right. In consequence of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved from its position on the line Menin-Warneton and replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the IV Cavalry Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of the Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were continued with frequent reinforcements of fresh troops, had the effect of holding the enemy and drawing a strong force to meet them. They were not, however, destined to have any decisive success, for the offensive strength of the Sixth Army had been reduced by previous fighting, and it was not sufficient to break through the enemy’s strongly entrenched positions.[24] All the more therefore were the hopes of Germany centred in the Fourth Army, which was fighting further northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of the campaign in Western Europe at this period.