Ypres 1914: An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff

by Otto Schwink

It will be understood then that the first thing for the weak and widely separated battalions of the 44th Reserve Division to do on the 25th was to get breathing space and reorganise, even though they were exposed all the time to the heaviest fire from west, south and south-east. Further to the north, however, on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of these two divisions had been concentrated under the expert leadership of General von Ziethen, it began to prepare the way for the infantry attack. By midday both the divisions were advancing steadily towards the railway embankment on the line Ramscappelle-Pervyse. The Belgians had to evacuate position after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire was poured in by the enemy’s artillery about Nieuport; and simultaneously a brigade of the 6th Reserve Division south-east of Pervyse had to be directed southwards in order not to lose touch with the right wing of the 44th Reserve Division. There were no reinforcements to fill up the gaps, and thus the attack came shortly afterwards to a standstill.

A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly from the south: the German artillery, including 42-centimetre guns, had bombarded Dixmude throughout the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and now the 43rd Reserve Division had begun its assault on the town. It resulted in the most violent street fighting; fast and furious came the bullets from the machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of the town, and from the shells from the batteries massed west of the Yser, but nothing could hold up our attack. The Belgians have given the following description of the power of the German assault: ‘What plunder must not they have been promised, to allow themselves to be killed in such a way? What drink must they not have taken to give themselves such animal courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, they storm forward with the howls of wild beasts; lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot down in hundreds, they keep coming on. Then follow isolated fights with bayonets and the butts of rifles: some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls bashed in.’ The fight swayed backwards and forwards till well into the night: guns brought up into the front line fired at point-blank range: both sides put in their last reserves.

During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets fixed, and we attacked again. A small German detachment of about fifty men advanced across the Yser bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the enemy’s batteries, it succumbed to greatly superior numbers. Thus the morning of 26th October found the attackers back in their assault-positions: their courage, spirit and indifference to death having added another leaf of fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It was clear, however, that another artillery bombardment was indispensable to success, and it was carried out on the 26th and 27th.

That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and the French Marine Fusiliers in the fighting just described is shown by the fact that on the morning of the 26th Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly brought up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A German attack on the 28th was able to make some progress on the southern flank against these fresh troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No further effort was made on the 29th, for there was a shortage of artillery ammunition. The eastern edge of the town was, however, bombarded by trench-mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect.

Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII Reserve Corps should only leave a weak force of from three to four battalions on the eastern bank of the Yser opposite Dixmude; that Dixmude should be kept under heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder of the 43rd Reserve Division should cross the Yser, north of Dixmude, in order to attack the town from the rear.

North-west of Dixmude, by the evening of the 29th, the troops of General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve Division had worked their way forward some 300 yards towards the railway embankment. Only one brigade of the 4th Ersatz Division was still north-east of Nieuport: all the rest were taking part in the struggle further south, and west of the Yser. Nieuport was shut in on the south: the left wing of the 44th Reserve Division lay west of Beerst, as protection against the strong hostile forces near the river about Dixmude: the Belgians and recently-arrived French forces held the railway embankment between Nieuport and Dixmude. Broad stretches of wire entanglements lay in front of this strong position, and the efforts of our troops had been almost superhuman in their advance over this ground: it was intersected with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards broad, and thick, wired hedges. So strong, however, was the pressure against the enemy that the French were compelled to reduce their forces about Nieuport and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant reinforcements to the area Pervyse-Ramscappelle. A German airman, who was killed on the morning of the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault began at 6.30 A.M., though the ground in the area of the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had become extraordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water to such an extent. Nevertheless the attack made considerable progress. The 11th Brigade of the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village of Pervyse, whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the 48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments reached the railway embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it towards Ramscappelle. Although every house had to be attacked, it succeeded in reaching the western end of the village. The 12th Reserve Regiment also made considerable advance.

The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when the 33rd Ersatz Brigade on the northern wing advanced from the north-east against Nieuport, the enemy retired. Airmen reported enemy’s columns retreating towards Furnes. Nothing could stop the victorious advance of General von Beseler’s troops, not even the heaviest guns of the British battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 yards, nor the incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian Divisions. On the evening of the 30th Ramscappelle was completely in German possession, the railway embankment south of it had been reached and even crossed in places; in Pervyse the fight was progressing favourably, and south of it the 12th Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad dykes, was working forward to the railway. Still further south the 44th Reserve Division was in full advance towards the railway embankment east of Oostkerke, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve Division had crossed the Yser, without casualties, and had been sent forward in the direction of Caeskerke.

The attack was to have been continued on the following morning, and General von Beseler intended to withdraw the last part of the 4th Ersatz Division, the 33rd Ersatz Brigade, from the area north-east of Nieuport, for the fire of the enemy’s naval guns from the sea[42] and the difficulties of the country appeared to militate against any prospects of a rapid success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported that the attack could be continued no further owing to the constant rising of the water. What had happened? On the morning of the 30th the advancing troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it had gradually risen until they were now wading up to their knees, and they could scarcely drag their feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down for a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, he was lost. The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off. But the rising flood soon prevented the movement of wagons with ammunition and supplies, and when the attackers looked back from the railway embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole country had sunk behind them: the green meadows were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the general line of the roads was only indicated by the houses and the rows of partly covered trees. It soon became evident that the enemy must have blown up the canal-sluices, and called in the sea to his aid. The advance of General von Beseler’s III Reserve Corps had been the culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his reserves had been put in to stop it, but in vain. If the Germans could only succeed in pushing the exhausted Belgians and French out of their way, the road to Dunkirk and Calais was open. Warnings, friendly and otherwise, had been given by the Allies to the Belgians that they must ‘hold out’; but they were no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of Antwerp now than when behind fortress ramparts. Their fighting spirit was broken; so, influenced by the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert finally decided to employ this last desperate means of defence, and place a wide expanse of his fair country under water. The water-level rose slowly and insidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the Yser north of Dixmude had almost everywhere overflowed its banks. The inundation destroyed buildings as well as soil, but it enabled the worn-out defenders to recover their sore-threatened security.

General von Beseler quickly realised the danger which now awaited his attacking troops on the far side of the canal, behind whom a sheet of water, 2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to make, yet it had to be done. The attack would have to be given up and the greater part of the western bank of the river evacuated. The order was issued and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st October. In spite of the dangers due to the altered appearance of the country and the consequent difficulty in finding the way, and although the Franco-Belgian artillery kept the Yser crossings under constant heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. Not a wounded man nor rifle fell into the enemy’s hands, and the movement was so well covered that the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until it was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers under Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind for a long time in Pervyse. In front of them the enemy was sweeping the village with artillery and infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an apparently boundless sea. A French colonel offered Lieutenant Buchholz honourable conditions if he would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off with his little band of followers. They rejoined their unit successfully. The enemy only followed up slowly along the roads, with weak detachments of infantry. Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the line St. George-Stuyvekenskerke, whilst the main body on the 31st took up its new position east of the Yser as follows: the 5th Reserve Division north of the main road St. Pierre Cappelle-Mannekensvere; the 4th Ersatz Division in the area Mannekensvere-Schoore; and the 6th Reserve Division to the south of it. One battalion and one battery of the 4th Ersatz Division remained facing Nieuport, extending northwards to the coast. A new defensive position was selected along the line Westende-Mannekensvere-Schoore-Kasteelhoek: a continuation of the attack was now out of the question, as the water was still rising west of the Yser. On 31st October and 1st November, however, the XXII Reserve Corps again tried to press its attack southwards on the east bank of the river, in order to isolate the Dixmude bridge-head, but here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented movement, and on the evening of the 1st these brave troops also had to yield to the forces of nature and withdraw behind the Yser. This operation was carried out in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, and was unmolested by the enemy, for he lay in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for the time being Dixmude remained in possession of the French.