On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the 30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division had not been able to carry us into Gheluvelt.[65] General von Deimling and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary.
From the enemy’s point of view, however, the situation was anything but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von Deimling’s troops into Zandvoorde endangered the southern side of the Ypres salient, and the capture of Hollebeke brought the Germans within three miles of Ypres itself. Ypres was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the line Zandvoorde-Hollebeke in order to support the 7th British Division, which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore, the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable Würtemburg troops again tried to storm Messines.
On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops to meet the enemy’s reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was brought up in readiness north of the Lys behind the II Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that the Wytschaete-Messines ridge was of decisive importance, and that every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the II Bavarian Corps.
According to the enemy’s accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us Ypres, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the Ypres district. The fact that neither the enemy’s commanders nor their troops gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to fight the battle round Ypres, though their situation was most perilous, gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly.
At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten and a half miles. The enemy’s batteries were not long in replying; being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning, the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines, blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far back as the Lys, so that any regular transport of supplies became impossible. At Gheluvelt, however, the important northern corner of the Army Group Fabeck, the enemy’s hail of shells had but little result, because our capture of the high ground at Zandvoorde had made the work of observation very difficult.
After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of Gheluvelt was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously. Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and the 26th Reserve Jäger Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and 30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines, though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze of the enemy’s obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line. The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69] and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the assault, were the special target of the enemy’s sharpshooters, well trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy’s position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy’s counter-attacks, delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the dense woods near Reutel,[72] which were defended by a strong system of obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in trees.[73]
While this was in progress the last assault on Gheluvelt was taking place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village, and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its château and park was in German possession.[74] Colonel von Hügel took his storming parties of the 54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then, however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against Gheluvelt. The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a hero’s death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the enemy’s counter-attack failed and Gheluvelt became and remained ours, and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75] The enemy prevented our further advance beyond Gheluvelt by a heavy fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west of Gheluvelt. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the enemy’s staff work for some time. During the bombardment of Hooge, a direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British Division were working: one general and several staff officers were killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the woods west of Hollebeke, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far as Oosttaverne. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on Wytschaete.
We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the victor in the fight for the Wytschaete-Messines ridge? The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards Wytschaete, regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment was to enter Wytschaete from the east and the 21st from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the enemy’s artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately, however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern edge of Wytschaete, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the 21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night, and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.