The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of Messines, immediately put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the 51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November by the 11th Landwehr Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve. The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the Steenbeek stream. However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery fire from the commanding positions on Mount Kemmel.[89]
On the 3rd November the formation of a ‘Group Urach’ was ordered, consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the attack against the high ground east of Kemmel; but in the following days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general situation in this sector.
A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm Klein Douve with complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.
In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy’s operations against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change. The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops, especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy’s commanders, however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour, therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon discovered by our airmen.
During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still too weak to break through the enemy’s strongly entrenched positions, particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front.
If the attempt to break through south of Ypres was not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the Ypres battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at Lille on the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth Army, west of Lille; and this was followed by an order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV Corps at Arras. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for Roubaix, which was reached on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the Comines-Ypres canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for the offensive north of the Comines-Ypres canal there were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions.
The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to the Comines-Ypres canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near Klein Zillebeke and drove the recently arrived French troops from their position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of Zwarteleen, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy, the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy’s counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part, had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment captured the fortified position along the western edge of Veldhoek; with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander, hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including Landwehr men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering considerable loss.[93]
The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which Ypres can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November, took the high ground on which St. Eloi is situated.[94] To the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The enemy remained for a long time in the houses of St. Eloi, but the high ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave us a bird’s-eye view of the country east of Ypres, where the mass of the British field artillery was in position.
The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in and north of Wytschaete was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers, the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying to the north-west.
The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the Park north-west of Wytschaete. After a whole day’s fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south of Wytschaete. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park of Wytschaete was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend connected with Wytschaete Park, and the scene was worthy of it.[95]