[105] The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British line was marked by a ‘strong point’ which had been erected near the south-west corner of the wood, known later as ‘Black Watch Corner’: this was successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the Black Watch. Attacks were made on the 1st King’s lining the southern edge of the wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also further eastward and to the left of the King’s, on the 2nd Coldstream Guards. The Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the 54th Reserve Division: at neither of these points did the attackers meet with any success.
[106] A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed appreciably to its success.
[107] This is the eastern part of the wood known later as ‘Inverness Copse.’
[108] This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the 1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington’s.
[109] The 4th (Queen Augusta’s) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the Germans made no progress.
[110] This part of the German account is not borne out by the British versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on north-west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and coming out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was arrested mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them up with rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, orderlies from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of the 1st Brigade, assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was critical until about noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I. arrived on the scene. This battalion had been engaged for several days near Zwarteleen, and had just been brought up to Westhoek to act as Divisional Reserve. Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly counter-attacked the Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out headlong. Many of them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and southern sides by the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western edge of Polygon Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come up to Glencorse Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which extended thence to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment who had pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating any further. The King’s, to whom this account gives the credit for the Oxfordshire’s counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on the Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling that at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief part in the defeat of Napoleon’s Guard.
The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have been the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were pushed forward rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse.
[111] The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon 11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek was trifling in extent and value, and though ‘Hill 60’ and the wood north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected to produce a break-through. The ‘numerical superiority’ once again attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops.
[112] This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November in which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered by the 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of the Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks.
[113] The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this.