Writes Colonel Bowman, the friend of General Sherman, a scholar, a gentleman, and a gallant soldier: “In the plan of the battle, Hooker was to hold the enemy at Lookout Mountain, and carry it, if possible. General Sherman was to vigorously assault Missionary Ridge. As that was their vital point, the enemy would mass to defend it. This would weaken the centre, upon which Thomas would rush, to penetrate it. Simple and plausible as this plan seemed, and successful as it proved, to most men who looked up at the frowning and precipitous heights which towered even into the clouds, above Chattanooga, with rebel works studded with artillery commanding every rugged approach, the idea of carrying them seemed little short of madness. The rebels felt so secure as to risk sending Longstreet’s entire corps to Knoxville, where it closely besieged the army of Burnside. ‘By half-past three p. m. of the 24th,’ says Grant, ‘the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to near the tunnel, was in Sherman’s possession. During the night he fortified the position thus secured, making it equal, if not superior, in strength to that held by the enemy.’
“Before dawn of the 25th of November General Sherman was in the saddle, and had made the entire tour of his position in the dim light. It was seen that a deep valley lay between him and the precipitous sides of the next hill in the series, which was only partially cleared, and of which the crest was narrow and wooded. The farther point of the hill was held by the enemy, with a strong breastwork of logs and fresh earth, crowded with men, and carrying two guns. On a still higher hill beyond the tunnel he appeared in great force, and had a fair plunging fire on the intermediate hill in dispute. The gorge between these two latter hills, through which the railroad-tunnel passes, could not be seen from Sherman’s position, but formed the natural place d’armes, where the enemy covered his masses ‘to resist our turning his right flank, and thus endangering his communications with the Chickamauga depot.’ General Corse was to have the advance; ‘and the sun had hardly risen,’ says Sherman, ‘before his bugle sounded the “Forward.” ’
“His men moved briskly down into the valley and up the steep sides of the hill in front, and, in spite of all opposition, carried and held a sort of secondary crest on the enemy’s hill, which, however, was swept with a murderous fire from the breastworks in front. And now for more than an hour a very bloody and desperate conflict raged, our line now swaying up close to the breastwork, as though it would sweep over and engulf it, and anon dashed back, receding far away to its first conquest. Meanwhile, Sherman’s left, on the outer spur of the ridge, and his right abreast of the tunnel, were hotly engaged, and partially drew the enemy’s fire from the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Our artillery also plumped shot and shell into the breastwork, and strove to clear the hill in Corse’s front. About ten a. m. the fight raged furiously, and General Corse was severely wounded. Two brigades of reënforcements were sent up; but the crest was so crowded that they had to fall away to the west of the hill. At once the heavy masses of the enemy in a gorge, under cover of the thick undergrowth, moved out on their right and rear. So suddenly overwhelmed, the two supporting brigades fell back in some confusion to the lower edge of the field, where they reformed in good order; but, as they constituted no part of the real attack, the temporary rebuff was unimportant. General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General M. L. Smith still stubbornly held the attacking column proper up at the crest. General Grant says of them, ‘The assaulting column advanced to the very rifle-pits of the enemy, and held their position firmly and without wavering.’ ‘When the two reserved brigades fell back,’ says Sherman, ‘the enemy made a show of pursuit, but was caught in flank by the well-directed fire of one brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill.’
“The desperate and incessant attack of General Sherman was triumphantly successful. It was directed against, in the words of Grant, ‘the enemy’s most northern and vital point,’ and ‘was vigorously kept up all day.’ Sherman’s position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but also his rear and stores at Chickamauga. The enemy, therefore, began very early to mass his line down against the single gallant storming party. ‘At three p. m.,’ writes Sherman, ‘column after column of the enemy was streaming toward me, gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground.’ Long and anxiously he waited for the centre to open its part of the contest, and meanwhile held stubbornly to his bloody ridge under murderous fire. Grant, keeping his eye fixed on this key point, sent a division to Sherman’s support, but he sent it back with the note that ‘he had all the force necessary.’ Now at last the time had come for seizing victory out of doubtful battle. Hooker on the right had gallantly swept round the enemy’s left. ‘Discovering that the enemy,’ says General Grant, ‘in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once.’ It was ordered and gallantly executed. The huge masses with which Sherman was contending, now, to their dismay, found Thomas on their left flank, and the centre of their long line broken in. They turned; but it was too late. The white line of Thomas’s musketry swept up from ridge to ridge, and the army of Bragg was flung back, in overwhelming defeat, into the valleys of Georgia. Thus was the great victory of Chattanooga won.
“And now pursuit swiftly followed victory. The same night Sherman pushed his skirmishers out, and, finding that enemy had given way, sent a division after him to the depot, and followed it up at four a. m. with a part of Major-General’s Howard’s Eleventh Corps. As the column advanced, wagons, guns, caissons, forage, stores, pontoons, and all the ruins of a defeated army and an abandoned camp, were found on the route. At night of the 26th, so rapid was the pursuit that the rear-guard of the enemy was reached, and a sharp fight ensued, till darkness closed in. The next day all three armies pressed on, Hooker and Thomas sharing with Sherman the marching and fighting. General Sherman meanwhile detached Howard to move against the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, and destroy it. This was done, and communication thereby cut between Bragg and Longstreet. The same movement also turned the flank of the enemy, who were engaging Hooker so heavily further south at Ringgold that the latter sent to Sherman to turn their position. It was already done before Hooker’s messenger arrived. Continuing to Ringgold, he found General Grant. The enemy had been driven from Tennessee, and Sherman was ordered to move leisurely back to Chattanooga. The next day he effectually destroyed the railroad from half-way between Graysville and Ringgold to the State line, and General Grant ‘consented that, instead of returning to Chattanooga, he might send back all my artillery, wagons, and impediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as the Hiawassee.’ This, too, was effected, with the destruction of more railroad and the capture of more stores. ‘This,’ says Sherman, ‘was to have been the limit of our journey. Officers and men had brought no baggage or provisions; and the weather was bitter cold.’ But at this time Grant received an urgent appeal for relief from Burnside, stating that his supplies could only last until the 3d of December. Nothing but incomparable energy would save Knoxville and its gallant commander. Granger had already been ordered thither, but ‘had not yet got off,’ says General Grant, ‘nor would he have the number of men I directed. Besides, he moved with reluctance and complaint. I therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions of Sherman’s forces had marched from Memphis and had gone into battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command.’ Accordingly General Sherman received command of all the troops designed for relieving Knoxville, including Granger’s. ‘Seven days before,’ he writes, ‘we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee, with two days’ rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to the private included. Of course, we then had no provisions, save what we gathered by the road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant, that they needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough; and it had to be done.’
“That night General Howard repaired and planked the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed the Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. On the 2d of December the army hurried thence toward London, twenty-six miles distant, and the cavalry pushed ahead to save the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, held by Vaughn’s brigade of the enemy. They moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket, but found Vaughn posted strongly in earthworks containing artillery in position. They were forced to wait till night, when Howard’s infantry came up. During the night the enemy retreated, destroying the pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee, and leaving for Howard to capture at daylight a large quantity of provisions, four guns, and other material.
“The bridge was gone, and but one day of the allotted three remained. The same night, therefore, Sherman sent word to Colonel Long, commanding the cavalry brigade, that Burnside must know within twenty-four hours of his approach—ordering him to select his best material, to start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, ‘at whatever cost of life and horse-flesh.’ The distance to be travelled was forty miles, and ‘the road villanous.’ Before dawn they were off. At daylight the Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia to Morgantown; but even at this place the Little Tennessee was found too deep for fording. A bridge was skilfully extemporized by General Wilson—‘working partly with crib-work and partly with square trestles made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown;’ and by dark of December 4th the bridge was down and the troops passing. Next morning came the welcome message from Burnside, dated December 4th, that Long’s cavalry had reached Knoxville on the night of the 3d, and all was well. Just before this news, the diagonal bracings of Wilson’s bridge had broken, from want of proper spikes, and there was delay. But the bridge was mended, and the forced march continued, till, at Marysville, on the night of the 5th, a staff officer of General Burnside rode up to announce that Longstreet had raised the siege the night before. Sending forward Granger’s two divisions to Knoxville, General Sherman at once ordered the rest of his gallant army to halt and rest; for their work was done.
“General Sherman rode from Marysville to Knoxville, greeted General Burnside, and freely expressed his admiration at the skilful fortification of the place, including Fort ‘Saunders,’ where Longstreet’s assaulting columns had met a bloody repulse. Knoxville being saved, it was obviously best for Sherman’s army, excepting Granger’s two divisions, to return to support the suspended movement against Bragg. But before General Sherman left he received the following letter:
Knoxville, December 7th, 1863.
To Major-General Sherman: