It is a profound truth that not all the reality of the universe which presents itself to the human mind for analysis and interpretation, not all the reality of this universe, is to be found in the mere sum-total of the individual entities that constitute it, considering these entities each absolutely and in isolation from the others. Nor does all its real perfection consist in the mere sum-total of the absolute perfections intrinsic to, and inherent in, those various individual entities. Over and above these individual entities and their absolute perfections, there is a domain of reality, and of real perfections, consisting in the real adaptation, interaction, interdependence, arrangement, co-ordination and subordination, of those absolute entities and perfections among themselves. And if we realize this profound truth[403] we shall have no [pg 343] difficulty in recognizing that, while the thought-processes whereby we interpret this universe produce logical relations which we utilize in this interpretation, there is also in this universe itself a system of relations which are real, which are not invented, but are merely detected, by our minds.
According to idealists, relation is a subjective category of the mind. It belongs to phenomena only on the introduction of the latter into the understanding. “Laws no more exist in phenomena,” writes Kant,[404] “than phenomena exist in themselves; the former are relative to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, in so far as this subject is endowed with understanding; just as the latter are relative to this same subject in so far as it is endowed with sensibility.” This is ambiguous and misleading. Of course, laws or any other relations do not exist for us, are not known by us, are not brought into relation to our understanding, as long as we do not consciously grasp the two terms and the foundation on which the law, or any other relation, rests. But there are relations whose terms and foundations are anterior to, and independent of, our thought, and which consequently are not a product of thought.
“Sensations, or other feelings being given,” writes J. S. Mill,[405] “succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions to the alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties.” But, as M. Boirac pertinently asks,[406] “why do we apply in any particular case the one alternative of the two-faced category rather than the other? Is it not because in every case the concrete application made by our faculties is determined by the objects themselves, by an objective and real foundation of the relation?”
91. Mutual and Mixed Relations; Transcendental Relations.—There are, then, relations which are in some true sense real. But in what does the reality of a real relation consist? Before answering this question we must examine the main classes of real relations.
We have already referred to the mutual relation as one which has a real foundation in both of the extremes, such as the relation between father and son, or between a greater and a lesser quantity, or between two equal quantities, or between two similar people.[407] Such a relation is called a relatio aequiperantiae, a relation of the same denomination, if it has the same name on both sides, as “equal—equal,” “similar—similar,” “friend—friend,” etc. It is called a relatio disquiperantiae, of different denomination, if it has a different name, indicating a different kind of relation, on either side, as “father—son,” “cause—effect,” “master—servant,” etc.
Distinct from this is the non-mutual or mixed relation, which has a real foundation only in one extreme, so that the relation of this to the other extreme is real, while the relation of the latter to the former is only logical.[408] For instance, the relation of every creature to the Creator is a real relation, for the essential dependence of the creature on the Creator is a relation grounded in the very nature of the creature as a contingent being. But the relation of the Creator to the creature is only logical, for the creative act on which it is grounded implies in the Creator no reality distinct from His substance, which substance has no necessary relation to any creature. Similarly, the relation of the (finite) knowing mind to the known object is a real relation, for it is grounded in a new quality, viz. knowledge, whereby the mind is perfected. But the relation of the object to the mind is not a real relation, for by becoming actually known the object itself does not undergo any real change or acquire any new reality or perfection. We have seen already ([42], [50]) that all reality [pg 345] has a transcendental or essential relation to intellect and to will, ontological truth and ontological goodness. These relations of reality to the Divine Intellect and Will are formally or actually verified in all things; whereas the transcendental truth and goodness of any thing in regard to any created intellect and will are formal or actual only when that thing is actually known and willed by such created faculties: the relations of a thing to a mind that does not actually know and desire that thing are only fundamental or potential truth and goodness. This brings us to a second great division of relations, into essential or transcendental and accidental or predicamental.
An essential or transcendental relation is one which is involved in the very essence itself of the related thing. It enters into and is inseparable from the concept of the latter. Thus in the concept of the creature as such there is involved an essential relation of the latter's dependence on the Creator. So, too, every individual reality involves essential relations of identity with itself and distinction from other things, and essential relations of truth and goodness to the Divine Mind and created minds. Knowledge involves an essential relation to a known object. Accidents involve the essential relation of an aptitude to inhere in substances. Actio involves an essential relation to an agens, and passio to a patiens; matter to form and form to matter. And so on. In general, wherever any subject has an intrinsic and essential exigence or aptitude or inclination, whereby there is established a connexion of this subject with, or a reference to, something else, an ordination or “ordo” to something else, there we have an “essential” relation.[409] Such a relation is termed “transcendental” because it can be verified of a subject in any category; and, since it adds nothing real to its subject it does not of itself constitute any new category of real being. Like the logical relation it is referred to here in order to bring out, by way of contrast, the accidental or predicamental relation which is the proper subject-matter of the present chapter.
92. Predicamental Relations; their Foundations [pg 346] and Divisions.—An accidental or predicamental relation is one which is not essential to the related subject, but superadded to, and separable from, the latter. Such, for instance, are relations of equality or inequality, similarity or dissimilarity. It is not involved in the nature of the subject itself, but is superinduced on the latter by reason of some real foundation really distinct from the nature of this subject. Its sole function is to refer the subject to the term, while the essential or transcendental relation is rather an intrinsic attribute or aptitude of the nature itself as a principle of action, or an effect of action. The real, accidental relation is the one which Aristotle placed in a category apart as one of the ultimate accidental modes of real being. Hence it is called a “predicamental” relation. What are its principal sub-classes?
Real relations are divided according to the nature of their foundations. But some relations are real ex utraque parte—mutual relations, while others are real only on the side—mixed relations. Moreover, some real relations are transcendental, others predicamental. Aristotle in assigning three distinct grounds of predicamental relations seems to have included some relations that are transcendental.[410] He distinguishes[411] (a) relations grounded in unity and multitude; (b) relations grounded in efficient causality; and (c) relations grounded in “commensuration”.
(a) By “unity and multitude” he is commonly interpreted to mean identity or diversity not merely in quantity, but in any “formal” factor, and therefore also in quality, and in nature or substance. Things that are one in quantity we term equal; one in quality, similar; one in substance, identical. And if they are not one in these respects we call them unequal, dissimilar, distinct or diverse, respectively. About quantity as a foundation for real, predicamental relations there can be no difficulty. Indeed it is in a certain sense implied in all relations—at least as [pg 347] apprehended by the human mind. For we apprehend relations, of whatsoever kind, by mental comparison, and this involves the consciousness of number or plurality, of two things compared.[412] And when we compare things on the basis of any quality we do so only by distinguishing and measuring intensive grades in this quality, after the analogy of extensive or quantitative measurement ([80]). Nevertheless just as quality is a distinct accident irreducible to quantity ([77]), so are relations based on quality different from those based on quantity. But what about substance or nature as a foundation of predicamental relations? For these, as distinct from transcendental relations, some accident really distinct from the substance seems to be required. The substantial, individual identity of any real being with itself is only a logical relation, for there are not two really distinct extremes. The specific identity of John with James in virtue of their common human nature is a real relation but it would appear to be transcendental.[413] The relation of the real John and the real James to our knowledge of them is the transcendental relation of any reality to knowledge, the relation of ontological truth. This relation is essentially actual in regard to the Divine mind, but only potential, and accidentally actual, in regard to any created mind ([42]). The relation of real distinction between two individual substances is a real but transcendental relation, grounded in the transcendental attribute of oneness which characterizes every real being ([26], [27]).