Ontology, or the Theory of Being

by P. Coffey

Before inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate briefly the main divisions of final causes: some of these concern the domain of human activity and are of importance to Ethics rather than to Ontology.

(a) We have already distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic finality. An intrinsic final cause is an end or object [pg 410] which perfects the nature itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for instance, is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism. An extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent immediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is de facto realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic end. Thus, the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in relation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended by the Creator and de facto realized by each individual agency acting in accordance with its own particular nature.

(b) Very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the finis operis and the finis operantis. The former is the end necessarily and de facto realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently of any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means of it. The latter is the end expressly intended by the agent, and which may vary for one and the same kind of act. For instance, the finis operis of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant; the finis operantis may be charity, or self-denial, or vanity, or whatever other motive influences the giver.

(c) Akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious, or physical, or “natural” end, and a conscious, or mental, or “intentional” end. The former is that towards which the nature or “appetitus naturalis” of unconscious agencies tends; the latter is an end apprehended by a conscious agent.

(d) An end may be either ultimate or proximate or intermediate. An ultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake, as contrasted with an intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former, and with a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to realizing the others. It should be noted that proximate and intermediate ends, in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end, are not ends at all but rather means; only in so far as they present some good desirable for its own sake, are they properly ends, or final causes. Furthermore, an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively: absolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any ulterior or higher good; relatively if, though ultimate in a particular order as compared with means leading up to it, it is nevertheless capable of being subordinated to a higher good, though not actually referred to this latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it.

(e) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either objectively,—finis “objectivus,”—or formally,—finis “formalis”. The former is the objective good itself which the agent wishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the agent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective good. Thus, God Himself is the objective happiness (beatitudo objectiva) of man, while man's actual possession of, or union with, God, by knowledge and love, is man's formal happiness (beatitudo formalis).

(f) We may distinguish also between the real end (finis “qui” or “cujus”, and the personal end (finis “cui”). The former is the good which the agent desires, the good for the sake of which “cujus” gratia) he acts. The latter is the subject or person to whom he wishes this good, or for whom he wishes to procure it. Thus, a labourer may work to earn a sustenance for himself or also for his family. The real and the personal end are never willed separately, but always as one concrete good.

(g) The distinction between a principal end and an accessory end (motivum “impulsivum”) is obvious. The former can move to act of itself without the latter, but the latter strengthens the influence of the former. A really charitable person, while efficaciously moved to give alms by sympathy with the poor, may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others know of his charity.

(h) Finally we may note the theological distinction between the natural end, and the supernatural end, of man as a rational and moral agent. The former is the end due to man's nature, the latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature. God might not have created the world or man, and in this sense even the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of God; but granted that God did decree to create the world and man, an end corresponding to man's nature and powers was due to him: the knowledge, service and love of God as known to man by the light of natural reason. But as a matter of fact God, in His actual providence, has decreed for man an incomparably higher and purely gratuitous end, an end revealed to man by God Himself, an end entirely undue not only to man but to any and every possible creature: the Beatific Vision of the Divine Essence for ever in heaven.

108. Causality of the Final Cause; Relation of the Latter to Efficient, Formal, and Material Causes.—We can best analyse the influence of the final cause by studying this influence as exerted on conscious and intelligent agents. The final cause has a positive influence of some sort on the production, happening, actualization of effects. What is the nature of this influence? The final cause exerts its influence by being a [pg 412] good, an apprehended good; it exerts this influence on the appetite of the agent, soliciting the latter to perform certain acts for the realization, attainment, possession, or enjoyment of this good. But it must not be conceived as the efficient cause of this movement of the appetite, nor may its influence be conceived as action. An efficient cause must actually exist in order to act; but when the final cause, as an apprehended good, exerts its influence on the appetite it is not yet actual: not until the agent, by his action, has realized the end and actually attained it, does the end, as a good, actually exist. We must distinguish between the end as attained and the end as intended, between the finis in executione and the finis in intentione. It is not the end as attained that is a final cause; as attained it is an effect pure and simple. It is the end as intended that is a final cause; and as intended it does not yet actually exist: hence its influence cannot be by way of action. Perhaps it is the idea or cognition of the intended end that exerts the peculiar influence of final cause? No; the idea or cognition of the end actually exists, no doubt, in the conscious agent, but this is only a condition, a conditio sine qua non, for the apprehended good, the final cause, to exert its influence: nil volitum nisi praecognitum. It is not the cognition of the good, however, that moves the agent to act, it is not the idea of the good that the agent desires or strives for, but the good itself. It is the good itself, the known good, that exerts the influence, and this influence consists in the passive inclination or attraction or tendency of the appetite towards the good: a tendency which necessarily results from the very presence of the good (not really or physically of course, but representatively, mentally, “intentionally,” by “esse intentionale”; cf. [4]) in the agent's consciousness, and which is formally the actualization of the causal power or influence of the final cause. “Just as the efficient cause influences by acting,” says St. Thomas,[504] “so the final cause influences by being yearned for and desired”.