We have seen already ([55]) that the apprehension of order in things implies the recognition of some unifying principle in what is manifold. What, in general, is the nature of this principle? It is the point of view, the standpoint from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the manifold is carried out; in other words it is the end, object, or purpose, of the orderly arrangement. The arrangement, and the order resulting from it, will vary according to the end in view—whether, for instance, it be an arrangement of books in a library, of pictures in a gallery, of materials in an edifice, of parts in a machine. Hence St. Thomas's definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends: recta ratio rerum ad finem. When this adaptation is the work of human intelligence the order realized is artificial, when it is the work of nature the order realized is natural. Art is an extrinsic principle of order, nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of order, but is itself an intrinsic principle of order: the works of nature and those of art have this feature in common, that they manifest adaptation of means to ends.[524]
The subordination of means to ends realizes an order which has for its unifying principle the influence of an end, a final cause. The group of dynamic relations thus revealed constitutes what is called teleological order, the order of purpose or finality. The realization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous existence of co-ordinated parts or members in a system, a realized whole with complex, co-ordinated, orderly parts, the principle of unity in this system being the form of the whole. This realized, disposed, or constituted order, is called the esthetic [pg 429] order ([55]), the order of co-ordination, composition, constitution. In ultimate analysis, however, these two orders, the teleological and the esthetic, having as respective unifying principles the final cause and the formal cause, are not two really distinct orders, but rather two aspects of one and the same order: we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or final cause of each is identical with its forma substantialis or formal cause ([108]). But the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause, and consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the esthetic.
St. Augustine's definition of order as “the arrangement of a multiplicity of things, similar and dissimilar, according its proper place to each,”[525] reveals the material cause of order in the multiplicity of varied elements, the formal cause of order in the group of relations resulting from the arrangement or dispositio, and the efficient cause of order in the agent that disposes or arranges them. The final cause, though not directly mentioned, is implied in the fact that the place of each factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has to fulfil, the part it is suited by its nature to play, in contributing to the realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement.
If, then, order is the right arrangement or disposition of things according to their destination, or in the mutual relations demanded by their ends, it necessarily follows that the very existence of natural order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of chance but a purposive work, just as the existence of artificial order in products of human art implies that these products are not the result of chance but of activity influenced by final causes.[526]
It is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the influence of final causes. Right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent, undetermined and aimless physical agencies.[527] If we find in the actual physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals the influence of final causes, such difficulties [pg 430] do not arise from the fact that there is order in the universe, but rather from the fact that with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also. In so far forth as there is natural order there is cogent evidence of the influence of final causes. And so necessary is this inference that even one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final cause to account for that solitary instance. We mean by an authentic instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity, regularity, mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any group of natural agencies; for we allow that transient momentary collocations and concurrences of indifferent agencies, acting aimlessly and without purpose as a matter of fact, might present to our minds, accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena, the deceptive appearance of order.
Order, then, we take it, necessarily implies the existence and influence of final causes. This in turn, as we have already observed, implies with equal necessity the existence of Intelligent Purpose. If, then, there is natural order in the universe, there must exist an Intelligent Will to account for this natural order.
Leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in Natural Theology, there remains the simple question of fact: Is the physical universe a cosmos? Does it reveal order—a natural order distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the mechanical and fine arts, an order, therefore, realized not by the human mind but by some other mind, by the Divine Mind? The evidences of such order superabound. We have already referred to some of them ([106]), nor is there any need to labour the matter. Two points, however, in connexion with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe, call for a brief mention before we conclude. They are in the nature of difficulties against the ordinary, reasonable view of the matter, the view on which the theistic argument from order is based.
In accordance with the Kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the order which we apprehend, or think we apprehend, in the universe, is not really in the universe of our experience, but is as it were projected into this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition itself. It is therefore not real but only apparent, not noumenal but only phenomenal. It is simply a product of the categorizing, unifying, systematizing activity of [pg 431] our minds. It is a feature of the phenomenon or mental product, i.e. of the noumenal datum as invested with a category of thought. But whether or not it is a characteristic of the real universe itself man's speculative reason is by its very constitution essentially incapable of ever discovering. The theory of knowledge on which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous. For a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works on Epistemology. It may be observed, however, apart from the merits or demerits of the theory, that the experienced fact of order is by no means demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the exact location of the fact, if we may so express it. Order is a fact, an undeniable, experienced fact; and it looms just as large, and cries out just as insistently for explanation, with whichever of the imposing adjectives “noumenal” or “phenomenal” a philosopher may choose to qualify it; nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal.
The other difficulty arises from the existence of disorder in the universe. Pessimists of the type of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche concentrate their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder, the failures of adaptation of means to ends, the defects and excesses, the prodigality and penury, the pain and suffering, which abound in physical nature—not to speak of moral evil,—that they become blind to all evidences of order, and proclaim all belief in order an illusion.
The picture of