[45] Descartes, t. i. p. 299. “It is always in our power to prevent ourselves from pursuing a good which is clearly known to us, provided we should think it a good to show in that way our free will.”—Descartes, t. vi. p. 133. “The fulness of liberty consists in the great use of our positive ability to follow the worse, while we truly know the better.”—Ibid. p. 138.
[46] The question here relates solely to the brain, properly so called, (the lobes or cerebral hemispheres.) The rest of the encephalon does not serve in the operations of the understanding. See the preceding article, p. 29, et seq.
[47] Individual intelligences—an expression of Gall’s. “Each individual intelligence has its own proper organ.”—iv. 341.
[48] Even the instincts, according to Gall, have their memory, imagination, &c. “The instinct of propagation, that of the love of offspring, pride, vanity, possess, beyond contradiction, their perceptive faculty, their recollection, their memory, judgment, imagination, and their own attention.”—T. iv. p. 331. “The propensities and the sentiments likewise possess their judgment, their taste, their imagination, their recollection, and their memory.”—iv. 344.
[49] Gall, t. iv. p. 325.
[50] Ibid.
[51] See particularly t. ii. p. 5.
[52] “Had I to do with readers wholly free from prejudice, I should, in order to convince them of this, (the supposition of innate ideas,) have nothing to do but show them that mankind acquire all the knowledge they possess by the simple use of their natural faculties.”—Philos. Essay on the Human Understanding.
[53] “Locke contents himself,” says he, “with acknowledging that the soul perceives, doubts, believes, reasons, knows, wills, and reflects: that we are convinced of the existence of these operations; ... but he seems to have regarded them as something innate.” A short time before he had said, “We shall see that all the faculties of the soul appeared to him to be innate qualities.”—Traité des Sensations. (Extrait raisonné.)
[54] See t. iii. p. 81.