[75] Article “Liberté,” Diction. Encyclop.
[76] T. iii. p. 155. Such phrases cannot be concluded.
[77] T. iii. p. 213.
[78] Ibid. 219.
[79] “This term, instinct, is applicable,” says he, “to all the fundamental forces.”—T. iv. p. 334. And he does not see that as to the instincts and the understanding all is contrast. Upon this difference of instinct and understanding, see my work De l’Instinct et de l’Intelligence des Animaux, etc. Paris, 1845, 2d edit.
[80] It is true that this approximation astonishes him. “The predilection of animals for elevated places depends,” says he, “upon the same parts as pride, which is in man a moral sentiment! Let the reader imagine the astonishment excited in my mind by such a phenomenon.”—T. iii. 311.
[81] “Co-existing with the love of war, it (the carnivorous instinct) constitutes the intrepid warrior.”—T. iii. p. 258. “I know a head which, as to the organ of murder, approaches that of Madeline Albert, and the la Bouhours, except only that nature has executed it upon a grander scale. To witness suffering, is for this person to have the keenest enjoyment. Whoever does not love blood, is in his eyes contemptible.”—T. iii. p. 259. The pen refuses to transcribe such things, which fortunately, however, are pure extravagances.
[82] “From my reflections it follows that conscience is nothing but a modification, an affection of the moral sense,” (organ.)—T. iv. p. 210. “From all that I have said as to conscience, it follows that it can by no means be regarded as a fundamental quality: that it is really only an affection of the moral sense—or benevolence.”—T. iv. p. 217.
[83] T. iii. p. 321.
[84] T. iv. p. 272.