The Battalion was now meeting with much stiffer resistance and the advance had become slower. The British barrage had ceased and the enemy was better able to get his machine guns into action. Ground could now only be gained by infiltration, and by manœuvring sections round the flanks of enemy posts. Casualties were becoming heavier. At one point the attacking infantry came up against field guns, firing point blank at them. The 7th Battalion on the right was also meeting with strong opposition from the enemy in the village of Villers-en-Cauchies. But the advance still went on. The field guns were captured. It seemed as if the resistance would gradually be worn down.
Then, about 10-45 a.m., came the great enemy counter-attack. Appearing from the low ground to the south of Avesnes-le-Sec enemy tanks, eight in number, advanced against the attacking troops. All men of the Battalion agree that these tanks were of German pattern, and not captured British ones. The main force of their first attack fell upon the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, which gave way before them and began to retire. Capt. R. B. Broster of C Company and Sec.-Lieut. H. Rosendale of D Company were shot down by machine gun fire from a tank, whilst trying to rally the left flank. Sec.-Lieut. T. E. Jessop of A Company, with the greatest gallantry, collected several Lewis guns and, by a concentration of their fire, actually forced one tank to withdraw. He was seriously wounded a little later and was carried to safety by the men of his platoon. An unknown man of C Company was seen running behind another tank, bomb in hand, trying to find an opening into which to throw it; he too was shot down. Capt. W. Grantham of B Company was so seriously wounded that he died a few weeks later—a prisoner in enemy hands. But all was of no avail. With its left flank “in the air,” heavily pressed by the tanks in front, with no artillery—almost the only weapon which would have been effective—to support it, the Battalion began to withdraw. The withdrawal was slow and there was no panic. But all the hard-won ground, with its killed and wounded, its field guns and other trophies, was lost.
The Battalion halted a little in front of the road from which it had started little more than two hours before. All companies had become hopelessly mixed; the 6th Battalion, which had advanced in rear of the attacking troops, had become engaged, and its men were mingled with the men of the 4th Battalion. Furthermore, men from the battalions on the flanks had also wandered into the area in the confusion. The enemy, following hard on the rear of his tanks, had reoccupied the ridge, and was getting his machine guns again into action. His tanks, however, did not appear over the crest of the ridge; perhaps they were satisfied with the success gained, and feared to come into view of the British artillery. There was intense disappointment and not a little confusion everywhere.
Into the midst of this confusion the Commanding Officer threw himself. By his presence, personal energy, and utter disregard for danger, he quickly restored order. Time did not allow of separating the men into their proper companies, but officers and N.C.O’s, assuming command of whatever men were near them, including men of other battalions, resolved confusion into order, disappointment into hope; and the Battalion was a fighting force again. Then it advanced to the attack once more.
This second advance was not so orderly as the first had been, but, in some ways it was, perhaps, finer. Without a gun to support it, through a hail of machine gun bullets, with men falling in scores, the line went forward. The Colonel led, his Battalion followed. “The ridge must be taken at all costs.” Those had been the words of the Divisional Commander the night before. And Lieut.-Col. Mowat and his men meant to take that ridge. Slowly, at first by section rushes and later, when casualties became heavier and heavier, by infiltration, they pressed on towards the crest. Conditions were much worse, in every way, than they had been earlier in the day. Losses were appalling. Sec.-Lieuts. J. E. Bentley and H. M. Marsden, both of A Company, with many N.C.O’s and men, went down. But the advance never stopped. For a time the enemy maintained his position well, but, as the attack came nearer and nearer, his resistance began to weaken, and at length he gave way and retired. For the second time that day, about 1-0 p.m., the ridge was won. But at what a cost! Of the Battalion, over 650 strong, which had bivouaced by the railway at Escaudœuvres on the previous evening, little more than 250 remained.
The rest of the day passed comparatively quietly. The enemy made no further attempt to restore the situation, but any movement on the ridge was promptly shelled. There was much work to be done. During the afternoon the 6th Battalion was withdrawn to reorganise as Brigade Reserve. Companies were reorganised, their own men returning to them, and rectifications were made in the line. For a time there was some anxiety about the left flank, the next Brigade not being so far forward as the Battalion; this was, to some extent, met by sending up two H.Q. Lewis gun teams to strengthen that flank. In all this reorganisation Capt. A. Kirk, M.C., of A Company, was the right-hand man of the Commanding Officer. He established his Company H.Q. by the, now famous, straw stack, and exercised a general supervision over the whole of the front line.
When darkness fell the new line had been firmly established. Rain had fallen during the afternoon, all were thoroughly weary, and a deep sense of disappointment oppressed everyone. No one yet understood how great a success had really been gained; this it remained for the morning to show.
During the night active preparations were in progress for the advance to be continued the next day. The 6th Battalion relieved the 7th Battalion on the right, the latter becoming Brigade Reserve. Guns were pushed forward in the most daring fashion—some actually into No Man’s Land—ready to deal with hostile tanks should they again appear. The advance was to start at 12-0 noon, under cover of a heavy barrage. In the early hours of the morning the enemy heavily shelled the neighbourhood of Battalion H.Q. with “whizz-bangs,” but the meaning of this was not realised until the next morning. Actually, he was shooting away the ammunition before withdrawing his guns to the east of the La Selle River.
Next morning everyone was about early, though there was plenty of time before zero hour. The damp and cold of the night, and the discomfort of the narrow slits, which were the only cover available, were no inducement to late rising. The sun rose bright, but a thin mist hung about the ground. Preparations for the attack were leisurely made and the quietness of the enemy was commented on. But it was not until an officer’s patrol had pushed far out in front of the line, and the Brigadier himself had ridden nearly to Villers-en-Cauchies, that the situation was realised. The capture of the ridge on the previous day had made the enemy’s position untenable; he had withdrawn during the night, and all touch with him had been lost. Fresh orders were immediately issued—the Brigade was to advance at once, without any barrage, and make good the line of the railway which had been its first objective the day before. On the right the 24th Division had already started, and was well forward.
By 10-15 a.m. the Battalion was on the move. Covered by an advanced guard, consisting of the H.Q. scouts and the remnants of a platoon of B Company, it moved forward in artillery formation, two companies in front and two in support. The 6th Battalion maintained the alignment on the right, but some difficulty and delay were caused by the 146th Infantry Brigade, which did not move on the left until some time later. At first the advance led over the ground that had been won and lost on the previous day. Everywhere was evidence of the stern fight that had been made. The tracks of the tanks were clear in the grass, and the ground was strewn with the bodies of those who had fought and died. Only then was it realised how far the advance had, at one time, reached. The fate of many a man was cleared up. At one point a German machine gunner was found sitting behind his gun, dead; by his side lay the man who had killed him, also dead, with his bayonet right through the German’s body. The inevitable “booby trap” was also in evidence—a brand new German machine gun, with a wire running from it to a spot a few yards away; but there was no time to examine the appliance.