Also, the bridge-head was so small, and movement so restricted, that the enemy could hardly go wrong in his shelling. What was called “a quiet day” in the neighbourhood of Nieuport would have been described by some such phrase as “great activity on the part of the enemy artillery” on most other fronts.
It is hard to say which parts of the sector were most heavily shelled. No part was free from shelling. Even the transport lines at Coxyde Bains had their share on more than one occasion. Probably the worst localities were Nasal Support, the Redan, and the bridges. The quietest time of the day was the early morning, between 4-0 a.m. and 8-0 a.m. Just before dawn it was the enemy’s general custom to put down a heavy barrage on Nasal Support, probably intended to overwhelm any troops who might be assembled for an attack. After that, most of the German gunners apparently took time off for breakfast and an hour or two’s rest. About 8-0 a.m. things would begin to liven up, and there would be plenty of activity throughout the rest of the day. But the nights were the worst. Practically every night was one inferno, from dusk until dawn. High explosive rained down all over the sector, shrapnel burst above the bridges and the Lombartzyde Road, the neighbourhood of Battalion H.Q. and the Redan were deluged with gas shells, both mustard and diphosgene. Shells of every calibre were used, from the giant 15-inch, which came over with a roar like that of an express train into Nieuport, down to the “whizz-bang,” which harassed one in the neighbourhood of the Aid Post. No attempt was made to keep telephone lines going except to Brigade H.Q. and to the Nasal Lane company, and these were continually broken. Practically all communication had to be done by the runners, who had a very hard time and suffered many casualties. There had been a long-standing discussion, between those who had been near Ypres in 1915 and those who had been at Johnstone’s Post in the following year, as to which of these places was the worse shelled. But the Battalion had not been long in front of Nieuport before it was mutually agreed that the argument might be dropped. Nieuport beat all previous records.
But, with the exception of artillery fire, the enemy showed little activity. Machine guns were quiet; sniping was almost unknown. There was some trench-mortaring of the two front lines, but this was negligible compared with the artillery fire. The enemy front line was very lightly held, but on two occasions his patrols were seen in No Man’s Land, though no encounter took place.
Heavy as was the enemy artillery fire, the activity of the British gunners was greater. The German attack of July 11th had caused great anxiety to the higher commands, and an enormous weight of artillery had been brought up. Behind Nieuport, the country was packed with guns of all calibres, and firing programmes were so arranged that some batteries would always be in action. As many as 18,000 shells were sometimes fired on that front in a single twenty-four hours. The protective barrage which could be put down by the eighteen-pounders was thicker than the Battalion had ever dreamed of; where it had been used to a single gun, there was here, not a battery, but a brigade. On one occasion, when a S.O.S. was sent up on the sector, the eighteen-pounders alone fired over 8,500 rounds in about half-an-hour. And on that sector every available gun fired on S.O.S.
Such was the Lombartzyde Sector in which the Battalion spent the first half of August, 1917.
As has already been said, the night the Battalion took over the line was particularly quiet. But a very clear warning was given by the outgoing battalion that this was not the normal state of affairs. The only casualty of importance that night was Capt. N. Geldard, O.C. D Company, who was wounded in the Redan. But the first complete day that the Battalion spent in the sector it had a taste of what was in store for it, suffering heavier casualties[9] than on any previous day since it left the Somme battle in September, 1916.
One of the main features of this tour in the line was the great patrol activity. Nightly, four standing patrols—one to every two hundred yards of front—were pushed out into No Man’s Land, to give early warning of any attempt by the enemy to assemble for the attack. The whole of the enemy wire, or rather what remained of it for the British artillery had done its work well, was reconnoitred. But the main point of interest was a post[10] in the old British front line, which had been retained by the enemy after his abortive attack on July 11th. This post lay just to the west of the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road, and it was hoped to regain it in connection with a raid which was pending. The position was carefully reconnoitred by Sec.-Lieut. A. J. Robb, of A Company, the officer detailed to carry out the operation.
The raid was to be carried out by a company of the 1/6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt., and was to penetrate as far as the enemy second line, on the west of the Nieuport-Lombartzyde Road. It was arranged that Sec.-Lieut. Robb’s platoon should form up and advance in rear of the raiding party. When the latter had captured the enemy post and advanced to its second objective, Robb was to occupy the post, consolidate and garrison it. Zero hour was fixed for 1-0 a.m. on August 8th, and, by 3-30 a.m., the whole platoon was to be withdrawn, with the exception of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men, who were to form the permanent garrison of the post. Thus only two hours and a half were allowed for the capture of the post and its consolidation, the carrying up of stores, and the opening up of communication with the left of A Company along Nose Trench.
At zero hour the raiders went over under a fine barrage. They captured the enemy post, penetrated to their second objective, and returned with a light machine gun and several prisoners of the 199th German Division. The 4th Battalion party was not so successful. Advancing in rear of the raiding party, most of them lost direction and did not arrive at the post at all; some of them went forward as far as the German second line and started consolidation there, thinking they had reached the right spot. Eventually, they discovered their mistake and withdrew with the 6th Battalion. The result was that Sec.-Lieut. A. J. Robb, on reaching his objective, found that he had only one N.C.O. (Cpl. J. Yates) and about six men with him. These he at once set to work, while he went out to seek the rest of his platoon. He failed to find any of them. Not long after the raiders had withdrawn an enemy party advanced to reoccupy its post. A bombing fight ensued in which Cpl. Yates succeeded in driving off the enemy; but when the fight was over he found he had only four unwounded men left. About 2-25 a.m. Sec.-Lieut. Robb returned to the post, and, as the number of men he had available was quite inadequate even for the defence of the post, and still more so for all the necessary work of carrying and consolidation, he ordered a withdrawal. Soon after, the enemy reoccupied the post. Dawn was now so near that there was no time to organise and carry out another operation, so the enemy was left in possession.
The following night a combined operation by artillery and gas projectors was carried out on the Lombartzyde Sector with no other result, from the Battalion’s point of view, than to bring down heavier fire than usual. Then, on the night of August 9/10th, the 1/6th Battalion Duke of Wellington’s Regt. took over the line, and the Battalion went into Brigade Reserve, in what were known as the Presque L’Isle Defences.