1. The 49th Division was to advance straight towards the point of the Belle Vue Spur, an offshoot of the main Passchendaele Ridge, on a frontage of about 1,500 yards.
2. Two objectives were to be captured and consolidated, the second objective being about 1,250 yards from the British Front Line.
3. The attack was to be made by the 148th Infantry Brigade on the right and the 146th Infantry Brigade on the left, each having two battalions in the front line. The 147th Infantry Brigade was to be in Divisional Reserve.
It was thus very uncertain what the role of the Battalion would be. Its orders were to be assembled at Pommern Castle by zero hour (5-20 a.m.) ready to move at a moment’s notice. There it was to remain until further orders were received from Brigade H.Q., and, as it was the reserve battalion of the Brigade, these orders were not expected very early.
The morning of October 8th was bright and sunny, and the ground was drying up splendidly. But about the middle of the afternoon very heavy rain began to fall which continued, almost without a break, right through the night. The ground, already in very bad condition, was thus rendered almost impassable in many places, and the assembly of the attacking Brigades was seriously hampered.
(b) October 9th.
By 5-0 a.m. on October 9th the Battalion,[11] with the exception of most of B Company, who had not yet returned from a carrying party, was assembled at Pommern Castle ready to move. At 5-20 a.m. the barrage opened, several batteries near where the Battalion was assembled being in action, and all knew that the attack had begun. For about two hours nothing happened; save for the noise of the guns, everything was quiet, and no news of the attack came through. About 7-30 a.m., orders were received for the Battalion to advance to the vicinity of Aisne Farm, some six or seven hundred yards west of Kansas Cross. B Company’s carrying party had not yet returned, so guides were left behind for them, and the rest of the Battalion moved off in artillery formation, with platoons at fifty yards’ interval. The ground was very wet after the heavy rain of the night before, and movement was slow and laborious. The Battalion had scarcely reached its destination when fresh orders arrived, directing it to proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of Korek, where it would come under the orders of the 146th Infantry Brigade, whose advanced H.Q. was there. The route followed was along No. 6 Track, a single line of grids in none too good condition. Platoons had to move in single file, and, as they drew near to Korek, came under heavy artillery fire which caused several casualties—the first suffered that day. On arrival there the Battalion halted and began to dig in as the artillery fire was still heavy. While it was thus engaged, the remainder of B Company came up, so that the Battalion was again concentrated. The Commanding Officer went personally to the 146th Infantry Brigade H.Q. for orders and information as to the situation. The latter, he found, was very obscure. It was not definitely known where any of the Battalion H.Q. were situated; the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. was believed to be at or near Peter Pan, the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. somewhere between Kronprinz Farm and Yetta Houses. The only definite information was that both were in need of reinforcements, and the Commanding Officer was accordingly ordered to send up two companies in support of each. He returned to his Battalion H.Q. and orders, as definite as the situation would admit, were issued at 10-50 a.m. A and B Companies were placed under the command of Capt. A. E. Mander, whose instructions were to report to the 1/7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt. and place himself under its orders. C and D Companies the Commanding Officer decided to lead in person to the assistance of the 1/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regt.
R.S.M. F. P. STIRZAKER, M.C.
(Killed).