At the moment the 49th Division was too scattered for immediate combined action. Divisional H.Q. was still at Chateau Ségard, and in the same area the 148th Infantry Brigade was concentrated. The 147th Infantry Brigade had all arrived in the neighbourhood of Reninghelst by the evening of April 9th. But the 146th Infantry Brigade was still holding the line astride the Menin Road. It was due to this that, during the first fortnight of the operations which followed, the Division was not able to act as a unit.
When the Battalion arrived in camp, on the evening of April 9th, everyone expected to remain there for two or three days. It was the general idea that the Division would concentrate in that area, and then move down to the Somme battlefield. Hence, preparations were made for spending the night. The Commanding Officer was dining with Lieut.-General A. J. Godley, at Corps H.Q., and was not expected back until late. The Battalion was turning in for the night when he suddenly returned, bringing early information of an immediate move. He had heard of the disaster on the Portuguese front, and brought the news that the 147th Infantry Brigade was to be pushed into the battle at once. Immediately, all was bustle and excitement in the camp, and never had the men been in better spirits than when they heard that the Battalion was for battle at last. Little time was needed for preparation. Soon after midnight all were in motor buses hurrying south. At Neuve Eglise, through which the buses passed, the gravity of the situation was apparent. Transport vehicles and guns were being hurried back, while already enemy shells were dropping in the village. At La Crèche, which was reached at 3-15 a.m., the Battalion debussed, and marched through the darkness to Le Veau, arriving at 4-30 a.m. Here some empty huts and stables were found, and into these the men were put to get what rest they could. Picquets were posted, for the situation was so obscure that no one knew how soon the enemy might be upon him. And the Battalion waited for orders.
About 6-30 a.m. orders were received from 147th Infantry Brigade H.Q., to move up to a position of readiness near the cross-roads at L’Epinette. Packs were dumped in a hut at Le Veau, a hurried selection was made of the personnel of B Echelon who were not to go into battle, and about 7-0 a.m. the Battalion[15] moved off. All along the road was witnessed one of the most pitiful sights of warfare, common enough in the early days of 1914, but never before seen by the Battalion. Everywhere civilians were leaving their homes and flocking to the rear; old people, women, and young children, some driving an odd cow or two, others pushing a few of their most valued household goods in barrows, plodded wearily along. Fortunately the enemy was not shelling the road, so the troops were able to advance without hindrance, except from one low-flying aeroplane. L’Epinette was reached before 8-30 a.m. and the men began to dig in. Little was known of the situation, but from observation it appeared that the British were withdrawing to the north bank of the River Lys, particularly about the loop to the west of Erquinghem.
The Battalion had been placed at the disposal of the 101st Infantry Brigade (34th Division), and about 9-30 a.m. the G.O.C., Brig.-General B. C. Gore, came up, explained the situation, and issued his orders as follows:—
1. The 101st Infantry Brigade was holding a line south of the Bac St. Maur-Armentiéres Railway, with the 16th Battalion Royal Scots on the right and the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt. on the left. This line the enemy had penetrated near the Rue Delpierre, between the two battalions.
2. The Battalion was ordered to send up two companies to close this gap in the line, and to place its remaining companies in positions north of the railway, in support of the Royal Scots and Suffolks respectively.
Company commanders were immediately summoned and the situation was explained to them. C Company, with D Company in support, was ordered to move up by the Rue Delpierre and close the gap. B Company, with A Company in support, was to assemble near the Rue du Moulin and advance to the assistance of the Royal Scots.
About 10-0 a.m. all companies moved off and Battalion H.Q. went forward to Wigan Post, some 500 yards north of the river. Enemy shells were already bursting around, and several direct hits were made on the road. The numbers of wounded who were streaming back showed only too clearly how severe the fighting was. Yet, quietly and in perfect order, the companies marched down to the River Lys by platoons. The main bridge was destroyed, but B Company, which was leading, succeeded in crossing by a wooden bridge near by, though this was also badly broken and only possible for men in single file. All the other companies crossed by a wooden bridge near the church. From this time, except A and B Companies which were in close touch throughout the day, companies were separated and their doings must be told individually.
On arriving in Erquinghem, B Company marched along the main street of the village, and took cover at the west end, while Capt. N. T. Farrar and Sergt. R. G. Brunt went forward to reconnoitre. They soon found that the situation was very different from what had been reported. Not only was the enemy to the north of the railway, near the Rue du Moulin, but he also appeared to be occupying the whole of the ground in the loop which the river makes to the west of Erquinghem. His outposts were in farms, only about 200 yards west of the village, and there was no sign of any formed body of Royal Scots. In these circumstances any attempt to advance south would almost certainly have led to disaster, so Capt. Farrar decided to take up a position covering the west end of the village. Between the river and the Rue du Moulin was an R.E. yard, with piles of trench grids and other stores; this B Company garrisoned with three platoons, pushing out its fourth platoon about a hundred yards in front. Its left was covered by a Lewis gun section which could fire, either along the road to the west, or down the Rue du Moulin; to protect its right and cover a bridge over the Lys, which was its main line of retreat, A Company sent up a platoon and a half, under Sec.-Lieut. E. Clarke, between the R.E. yard and the river. These dispositions opposed an enemy advance either from the west or up the Rue du Moulin, and remained unchanged for five hours—until the order to withdraw was received. During that time, two separate attacks were made by the enemy on the village; but so heavy was the fire kept up by A and B Companies that these had no success. Parts of Erquinghem were heavily shelled, and many buildings were set on fire; but the R.E. yard escaped the attentions of the hostile artillery. The men were much harassed by machine gun and rifle fire. In particular, A Company’s platoon was heavily fired on from a farm house, only about a hundred yards away. Careful observation of this place through glasses revealed the fact that a large store of Mills bombs and Stokes shells was in an outhouse against the wall of the farm. Lewis guns were trained on this dump and fired for some minutes without success; but, suddenly, the whole dump blew up, completely destroying the farmhouse. As the place was packed with Germans, there is no doubt that they suffered very heavily. The British had excellent cover behind the piles of R.E. material, and, as a result, comparatively few casualties were suffered; but heavy losses were certainly inflicted on the enemy.
Late in the morning, an officer of the 11th Battalion Suffolk Regt. asked for reinforcements to close a gap in the line near the Rue du Moulin. In response, A Company sent up a platoon, which Sec.-Lieut. B. H. Huggard saw into position. This platoon was never seen again, and its fate was a mystery until after the armistice. Then, returned prisoners told how it had been surrounded by the enemy, and, after suffering heavily, the few survivors had been captured.