The general opinion on this memorandum was that it said quite enough, and yet not too much. It was quite clear and plain, and nothing seemed wanting but the declaration of war and the attack of a superior French Fleet.
We were very much surprised to hear from England that troops were on their way out, with the idea of operations in the Black Sea. It seemed very risky, when France might declare war at any moment. But the general belief is that the Ministry must have had some assurances from the French Government which we know nothing about. Anyhow the transports began to arrive at Malta in a continual stream, and there received orders to proceed to Cyprus, where we hear preparations are being made for the reception of the troops. The Orient, with the Duke of Connaught on board, did not come in; she only closed sufficiently to receive a signal changing her destination to Cyprus, and went on. Several cruisers from the Channel appeared at intervals, watching over the safety of the troopers; they were not interfered with, and went on to Cyprus.
News of the Spanish alliance and orders to proceed to Spezzia to form a junction with the Italian Fleet came simultaneously, and as the ships steamed out of the harbour the whole population swarmed over the forts and walls and cheered in the wildest way, which, on a signal from the Admiral, the ships returned heartily. At Spezzia we found six ships ready, with orders from home to watch Toulon, but not to make any attacks upon the French unless they should attempt to attack Italy by sea. Simultaneously with these orders we heard of the Duke of Edinburgh’s wonderful and bloodless success in the North Sea. But there was a general sound of congratulation that our force in the Mediterranean was not powerful enough to compel such obedience as we had enforced in the North. The Italians, ashore and afloat, were in a wonderful state of enthusiasm. They crowded our ships during the few days we lay at Spezzia, and the women were so demonstrative of affection that some of the older officers did not half like it.
It soon became known that Sir George Tryon had decided to make Port Mahon the headquarters of the fleet, and to send cruisers only before Toulon. I should have said that we were now very fairly supplied in this way. They had been arriving from England almost daily while we were at Malta, and we had now fourteen, large and small, with the fleet.
For a reason which I did not at first understand, we only took four out of the six Italian ships that were ready with us to Port Mahon, namely, the Andrea Doria, the Francisco Morosimi, the Re Umberto, and the Rugiero di Lauria. Moreover, we left at Spezzia the Thunderer, Ajax, and Agamemnon. We noted that the Italian ships we took with us were the newest, and that those of our own we left were, in a sense, ‘lame ducks.’ But still there was a good deal of wonder that we should deliberately reduce our force to fourteen sail when we were almost closing with the enemy. It was whispered about later that orders from home had dictated the detachment, that war would be immediately declared by England against France, and that an attack would be made by Italian troops carried chiefly in the Italia and Lepanto, and supported by a combined Anglo-Italian squadron against Algiers.
However, we steamed away to Port Mahon, and in this magnificent harbour found a fresh relay of colliers and two more cruisers, the Apollo and Sappho, which showed us that there was a good deal of foresight at headquarters. We had the declaration of war immediately, and then we began to see where we were. We were, in fact, at bay. In no case was the French Fleet strong enough to hope to prevent our putting to sea, and there was practically nothing that France could do with her fleet, as long as ours was intact. And now, too, I began to see that we were, at Minorca, in a position to cover the proposed attack on Algiers. Any attempt of the Toulon Fleet to drive off our attacking forces would be liable to be met by a counter attack from ourselves. Yet if France could really produce eighteen battleships out of Toulon, while we could only furnish thirteen, we were running very great risks.
However, we went to work in a very business-like way. Tryon placed five of his largest cruisers, including the Amphion, Australia, and Undaunted, on the line to Toulon, giving orders that Lord Charles Beresford in the Undaunted, with Dunlop in the Australia to back him up, were to undertake the watch on the Toulon Fleet, closing with the harbour after dark, and drawing off before daylight each morning, but not so far as to lose touch with the port. Then the other three were to spread themselves towards Minorca, and to work backwards and forwards, so as to signal to each other and to Minorca at least once in every twenty-four hours.
For us at Port Mahon it again became a time of inaction; nothing to do but exercise and keep our coal supply up. But we now lay with fires banked and steam at half an hour’s notice.
We soon learnt that the seven ships had left Spezzia with several transports and cruisers; and we began to think that if France had any chance at all, she might have it by falling suddenly and swiftly on this weak detachment. The Admirals seemed sure that she would, and the utmost anxiety attended the reports from the signal station.