‘This was the evening of the third day since the debarkation had begun. Another cavalry regiment, with the remainder of the Horse Artillery battery, had been sent up to support us; and early the following morning Lord Wolseley, with several of his Staff, including Sir Baker Russell, who is in command of the Cavalry Division, joined us. About 6 A.M. I was looking down over the plain, when I saw two Bulgarian peasants apparently in fierce altercation, coming up towards the position where we were, escorted by one of the Hussars, who was vainly endeavouring to make himself intelligible to them. Presently they came in, one of them holding up a letter in his hand. One of the interpreters with Lord Wolseley in a short time made out their story. It appeared that a Russian officer, who had missed his way, had been seized and murdered by the villagers in the place to which these two men belonged. One of the Hussars had found them in possession of certain property of this officer, and had noticed that a bag of letters was part of it. Being an intelligent fellow, he had managed to make them understand that they should accompany him to Colonel French. The letter the man was holding up proved to be one of no importance, but it was only intended as an indication of the purpose for which he had come. His companion had what was evidently an officer’s sabretash, and on this being opened, several letters were found in it, evidently dispatched from the Russian headquarters to the commandant of the force before Varna. It informed him of the fact that the English troops, which were reported to have entered the Black Sea, were believed in Russia at the latest news to have all gone on towards Trebizonde. It informed him further that the Russian General proposed to make a direct march to the Dobrudja, and gave him the different halting points on the march. It informed him of the point at which he was to join the march, and told him that the greater part of the Cossacks and the remainder of the Russian cavalry would be required to watch the Bulgarian force, which, though inferior to the Russians, and at some marches distant, might be expected to follow up their retreat. It would therefore be necessary for the rather considerable cavalry force which was attached to the troops at Varna to protect the right flank, and to watch the advance of the main army when it arrived. Without troubling your readers with the very ample information which this dispatch conveyed, I may say generally that the period at which the Russian Army, marching in two columns along two roads at some distance from one another, would arrive at about the level of Kosluji with its left column, was still about four days off. All this information we received later. At the moment I saw Lord Wolseley carefully reading through the translation of the dispatches as it was put into his hands.
‘Admiral Markham had ridden out with the party, and the first person to whom Lord Wolseley turned, after he finished, was the Admiral. A short discussion took place between them, the nature of which I did not at the moment hear, but which I have reason to believe related to the question of the amount of transport and supplies that could be landed in the next day or two. At all events, it was evident to all of us in a very short time that the plans had been changed. Orders were immediately issued for the march that afternoon of the three brigades which had first landed; fortunately they were in the neighbourhood of Baltjik, so that they were the nearest to Varna. The Cavalry, with the mounted Infantry, were at once brought up, and extended so as to cut off all communication between the main Russian Army and Varna.
‘Fortunately the country in this neighbourhood consists of a series of undulating uplands, with numbers of features permitting the concealment of large bodies of men.’
To tell the story as we now know it from various sources, the opportunity which presented itself to Lord Wolseley’s mind as he read the intercepted dispatch was just this. It was evident from the information brought in by the Bulgarians, and from other sources, that the Russians were still ignorant that an English force had landed in the country. If he could immediately surprise the camp at Varna, he would have at least a highly probable opportunity of breaking in upon the Russian columns on their march, and annihilating one before the other could come to its support; especially seeing that they were relying upon the Cavalry of the Varna force to cover their movements. This was a far more brilliant opportunity than that which had been at first hoped for when the taking up a position, which would oblige the Russians to attack, had been designed. The intention was for the three Infantry brigades to move up that night in two marches into a position within reach of attack of the Russian camp at Varna, and actually to make the attack at grey dawn on the following morning.
Lord Charles Beresford was, according to arrangement, to land in the evening with no particular attempt at concealment with a party of Blue Jackets and Marines, and to arrange with the Bulgarian Officer in command at Varna, for a sally of the whole Bulgarian garrison so as to attract the attention of the Russians towards the Varna side at the moment when our attack was made. Watches having been carefully compared, three o’clock in the morning was fixed upon as the hour for the simultaneous attack. The three brigades were to attack respectively the right, left, and centre of the Russian position.
A powerful force of Artillery was kept back about two miles from Varna in a favourable position in order to give support to our troops in the event of any disaster. But it was to be a pure Infantry attack, not a gun was to be fired, unless any of our troops were forced to retreat. The sole duty of the Cavalry was to cut off fugitives and prevent any knowledge of what had happened from reaching the Russian General.
We have reason to believe that some of the inhabitants brought off by the fleet had supplied Lord Wolseley with most accurate information as to the nature of the ground in the neighbourhood of the Russian camp, and that this had given him considerable confidence in arranging the details of the attack. Sir Evelyn Wood had charge of the whole of the actual attack, and very great advantage was found to arise from the practice in night marching which had been carried out under his orders at Aldershot.
It cannot, however, be said that the fighting on this occasion was a very severe trial for our troops. The British Army had to all intents and purposes dropped from the clouds upon the Russians before they were aware of its arrival. No very serious preparations had been made to resist attack from the north since there was no reason to anticipate troops coming from that side. The surprise the following morning was complete. That is to say, not that the Russians were caught in their beds, but that the English troops fully organised and ready for the attack were upon them, and into their lines, before the Russians had been able to prepare any organised resistance.
Only on one side, where an active Russian General had cautiously entangled the front of his position with obstacles, was the right brigade checked for a time, and, though some losses were occasioned here, the general effect of the attack on all sides of the Russian position, and the numerous places in which the works had been entered made it impossible for the troops who had resisted the attack of the right Brigade to hold out for any length of time. The Russians fought most gallantly, yet showed very little power of acting for themselves in a case where superior orders could not reach them.